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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Gamblers in the real world have been found to successfully navigate complex 
multivariate problems such as those of poker and the racetrack but also to misunderstand 
elementary problems such as those of roulette and dice. An account of gambling 
behaviour must accommodate both the strengths and weaknesses of decision making and 
yet neither of the dominating decision making traditions of heuristics and biases or 
Bayesian rational inference does. This thesis presents evidence supporting a model-based 
approach for studying gambling behaviour. The account is built on the premise that 
decision making agents hold a highly structured mental representation of the problem 
that is then refined through adjustments made by evaluating incoming evidence. In Study 
1, roulette games played at a casino illustrate the range of tactics beyond simple data-
driven strategies that are used in chance-based games. In Study 2, an experimental 
manipulation of the framing of a chance-based dice game highlights the role of prior 
beliefs about underlying outcome-generating processes. Studies 3 and 4 examine the 
impact of prior beliefs on subsequent information processing, using a laboratory-based 
slot machine paradigm. To complement these findings on a computational level, a 
modelling exercise in Study 5 shows indirectly that assuming a similarity mechanism of 
judgment is insufficient for predicting the impact of prior beliefs over time. Studies 6 and 
7 used racetrack and poker betting experimental paradigms to show that, although priors 
were integrated into decisions without evaluation, incoming evidence underwent 
information search and hypothesis and data evaluation processes. Implications for users 
of gambling research and for future directions of the field are discussed. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
―When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?‖ 
(J. M. Keynes, as cited in Malabre, 1994) 
 
While some economists may claim this logic in the face of disconfirming evidence, its 
sentiment is rarely heard in everyday discourse. Typically, people will go to great lengths 
to maintain their beliefs and keep their views of the world intact, sometimes deliberately 
but in many cases without even realising. This inclination toward consistency in policy 
and reasoning may be at the root of the problem of gambling. 
 
Consider a gambler who has just experienced a string of losses. Keynes might be 
compelled to change his opinion and walk away from the gamble but the more frequent 
response is to instead chase the losses, effectively believing anew after each loss that a 
future win is assured despite evidence to the contrary (Dickerson, Hinchy, & Fabre, 
1987; Lesieur, 1979).  
 
This example illustrates several of the motivating questions of gambling research: Why 
might someone continue to gamble despite losses? Why do only some people have 
problems with only some forms of gambling? This thesis aims to find what is missing 
from our current understanding of gambling such that we do not have answers to these 
questions. 
 
What is gambling? 
A gamble, in its broadest sense, is a trade-off between reward and uncertainty: risking a 
loss for the chance of gaining something greater. From an economic perspective, the 
elements of this formula are clearly gains, losses, and probabilities and the universal goal 
of any gambler is to maximise profit. But while a gain of one sort might feel satisfactory, 
a monetarily equivalent gain of another sort might not. Likewise, an increase in a future 
risk of a particular magnitude might feel acceptable but another equivalent increase in 
risk might not (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Uncertainty, that is, being unsure about 
future outcomes because of ignorance about the underlying outcome distribution or 
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outcome-generating process, leads to inconsistent preferences (Keren & Wagenaar, 1987; 
Schkade & E. J. Johnson, 1989) and opens us to exploitation. Unsurprisingly, gambles 
depend on uncertainty. 
 
To understand why people gamble, we can first examine how people gamble. It‘s unlikely 
that the punter standing before the bookmaker spends his time pondering over his 
utilities and risk preferences (though such a discussion of risk preferences in gambling 
would fill volumes), rather it is highly likely that his mind is making another sort of 
calculation: what is the outcome of the next event likely to be? To produce an answer 
involves inductive inference and learning and, perhaps, some specialist knowledge of the 
event itself because, unlike most experimental tasks, gambles outside of the laboratory 
are often rich in detail and hidden processes. But, importantly, the tools of inductive 
inference and learning used in gambling are not different from the tools we use in 
everyday reasoning. 
 
Gambling as part of the everyday 
In everyday reasoning, our decisions are made under uncertainty – we are rarely certain 
of the outcomes we will see in the future or the processes that will produce them. In 
processes as fundamental as perception (Freeman, 1994) and as complex as social 
judgment (Fiedler, 2000) there are parallels: there are infinite theories or functions that 
could produce the data we observe and so we must make inferences about the 
environment. Understanding the physical and social world, it has been argued, boils 
down to a statistical inference problem (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Kelley, 1967). What 
would it mean to view gambling as an inference problem? Simply assuming that future 
outcomes are unknown but that information previously known, rather than observed 
data alone, may be used to estimate those outcomes. Translated into the more familiar 
terms found in gambling: inference includes relying on our own previous experience with 
the game and other games like it, the playing tips received from others, the strategy 
books and articles read, and the observation of others nearby playing the same game. 
These data are naturally used as part of the judgment and decision making process in 
gambling. 
 
Despite the similarities between gambling and everyday reasoning, there is an important 
difference present in some forms of gambling that sometimes leaves gamblers who are 
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otherwise competent decision makers vulnerable: randomness. Although randomness is a 
form of structure, albeit a structure with no systematic bias to speak of, it is qualitatively 
different from the types of structures we encounter daily. Unlike the movement of 
clouds, for example, that are driven by hidden but causal processes, the randomness of a 
card shuffle or die roll is impossible to predict. Nonetheless, this does not stop gamblers 
from trying. 
 
Perspectives on gambling 
To explain how people make inferences in judgment and decision making in gambling, 
cognitive psychologists have converged on two approaches, which differ greatly in their 
assumptions and conclusions. Normative decision theory emerged from discussions of 
rational agents and expected value and utility. Heuristics and biases came from a need to 
describe the actual behaviour that researchers observed. The following pages review the 
theory and impact that each approach has had on the study of gambling.  
 
Normative decision models 
Normative decision theory identifies the best decision to make, assuming the decision 
maker has complete information and reasons rationally about the outcomes and their 
likelihoods. Players have been found to use normative theory as a playing strategy in 
blackjack (Wagenaar, 1988) and poker (Sklansky, 2004), among other games. For this 
discussion of a normative standard in gambling, there are two relevant approaches. 
 
A first account, dating from Hugyens in 1657 laying out probability theory and Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)  introducing utility theory, came to be viewed as a 
model of human decision making. Decision makers need only to calculate a probability-
weighted sum of the possible outcomes to determine the value of a gamble. Games with 
dice illustrate the straightforward use of a normative decision rule to calculate the value 
of gamble. If a bookmaker offered a punter a gamble for which the punter paid 25 pence 
for the opportunity to roll a die and earn £1 if he predicts the number correctly, an 
expected value calculation finds the terms are unfavourable: the punter has a 1 in 6 
chance of guessing the outcome correctly and gaining £1, so the expected value of his 25 
pence is only 17 pence, which is an expected loss of 8 pence for each play. And, as 
Savage (1965) points out, over repeated plays that are sure to include both wins and 
losses, the expected value of bad compounded odds does not get better.  
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A second normative model for gambling, more recently developed by Edwards and 
colleagues (1961; Edwards, Lindman, & Savage, 1963), brought Bayesian statistical 
inference to the field of decision making. Bayes‘ theorem is a general mathematical rule 
that is commonly used for belief updating using evidence that results in a posterior 
probability expressing the degree of belief about the likelihood of a hypothesis being true 
after observing data. The probability of a hypothesis based on evidence is a function of 
the probability of the hypothesis generally, the probability of the data generally, and the 
likelihood that the data were predicted by the hypothesis. The fundamental principle 
underlying this logic is the competition between hypotheses, and Bayes‘ theorem favours 
the hypothesis that is most likely relative to others. Griffiths, Kemp, and Tenenbaum 
(2008) demonstrate an application of Bayesian inference on determining whether a fair 
coin (a hypothesis of the probability of the coin landing on heads of 0.5) or biased coin 
(an alternative hypothesis of, for example, a probability of landing on heads of 0.9) 
produced a series of coin flips. Imagine initially believe that either hypothesis is equally 
likely to be true but then observing HHHHHHHHHH. According to Bayes‘ theorem, 
this sequence of evidence changes the likelihood that the coin is biased from even to 
357:1. If instead the sequence HHTHTHTTHT had been observed, the likelihood that 
the coin is fair would change from even to 165:1. Bayesian inference does not produce 
conclusive answers but does provide a systematic way to evaluate evidence. Instruction 
on using Bayes‘ theorem can be found in poker strategy books and Internet forums (as 
of this writing, more than 5,460 hits on Google for ―Bayes‘ theorem, poker‖) for 
applications such as evaluating the likelihood that an opponent holds a viable hand given 
his actions1. It is also being used in artificial intelligence to model learning against 
simplified players (Korb, Nicholson, & Jitnah, 1999). 
 
The normative models of gambling have played a central role in shaping our beliefs of 
what a rational gambler might be expected to do. Expected value as a threshold between 
rational and irrational gambling is now a universal concept. From this reference point, 
researchers have found deviations, clinicians have set therapy expectations, and 
policymakers have set industry standards. But how many would defend the normative 
model as a description of actual gambling behaviour?  
 
 
                                                 
1 However, not all instructions are accurate, likely reflecting a widespread misunderstanding of the theorem 
in the amateur poker playing community. 
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Beyond rational models? 
There are significant limitations of the applications of normative decision theory as a 
useful account of gambling behaviour. Although it is useful in its own right as a 
prescriptive account of how one ought to gamble, there are several demonstrations of its 
descriptive inadequacy. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) showed that people 
treat gains and losses differently from their objective values. It is widely accepted that the 
assumptions of Bayesian inference are ideal at best, as the imagination and cognitive 
capacity required to consider all evidence even-handedly, generate exhaustive sets of 
hypotheses, and calculate likelihoods are out of reach for most people, including experts 
(Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1978; Meehl, 1954). 
Probability and variance judgments are not consistent (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). And 
in a real-world gambling context, Keren and Wagenaar (1985) show that blackjack 
players deviate from the normative basic strategy, seem to be inconsistent in what 
strategy they do use, and believed that ―luck‖ played a significant role in generating 
outcomes. 
 
Beyond using the rational model as a reference point for ideal decision making agents, 
what can the clinician or policymaker use it for? The mechanisms underlying the 
hypothesis generation and updating process are impenetrable to a clinician seeking to 
understand individual behaviour. 
 
In a critique of the Bayesian perspective, Fischhoff and Beyth-Marom (1983, p. 257) note 
that a ―substantive understanding of the problem at hand‖ is necessary to accomplish 
many of the operations assumed by Bayes‘ theorem and normative decision making 
generally. Generating the possible hypotheses and prior knowledge relevant to the 
problem are not trivial matters. Continuing in this direction, consider that every problem 
has a higher-order structure underlying its outcomes. There are interdependencies and 
causal processes linking stimuli, actions, and rewards that we intuitively use for 
judgments, informing how we interact with the physical world and with each other. A 
complete account of gambling behaviour and cognition must acknowledge the roles of 
structure and outcome-generating processes.  
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The heuristics and biases approach 
Heuristics are strategies for producing estimations and predictions based on intuitive 
assessments rather than deliberative algorithmic processing. This intuition-based 
approach embraces the idea of gambling decisions as a subset of everyday reasoning. The 
three original heuristics introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1974) are 
representativeness (judging the likelihood of a hypothesis based on how closely it 
resembles the data), availability (judging the frequency of an event based on how easily an 
example comes to mind), and anchoring (relying too heavily on one piece of 
information). Despite being grounded in intuitive rules-of-thumb, the heuristics are not 
completely removed from the rational model as they are built on fundamental concepts 
of cognition like feature matching, similarity, and memory retrieval. For example, 
subjective probability estimations are similar to subjective estimations of physical 
quantities such as distance, whereby the distance of an object is not calculated but 
intuitively judged by its blurriness (far) or clarity (near).   
 
Consider representativeness, which is critical for a discussion of gambling as it is often 
cited as the source of likelihood judgments. When a likelihood judgment is mediated by 
an assessment of similarity to its parent population or reflects the process by which it is 
generated, decision makers are said to be using the representativeness heuristic. For 
example, sequences that include all possible outcomes are judged more likely than 
sequences that exclude any outcomes even if those excluded are highly unlikely, 
presumably because the sequence that includes all outcomes is deemed more similar to 
the parent population (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). Consider the coin flip, a random 
binomial process. The researchers found that a sequence of coin tosses that contains 
either obvious regularities or excludes some possible outcomes is not considered 
random. Overall, a sequence that is not representative of a random sequence is deemed 
non-random, or structurally biased. In other words: predictable. This belief in the 
negative or positive recency of a sequence of random events has been called, in turns, the 
gambler‘s fallacy (believing that the likelihood of an independent event occurring 
increases after an absence) and the hot hand (believing that the likelihood of an 
independent event occurring increases after a streak), and deemed responsible for many 
of the problems of reasoning exhibited by gamblers.   
 
14 
 
As in the example above, the heuristics approach is commonly applied to the study of 
gambling for explaining how gamblers irrationally deviate from rational choice and the 
probability calculus. A few examples include Rachlin (1990) applying availability to losses, 
Gilovich (1985) applying representativeness to streak shooting, and Rogers (1998) 
applying anchoring to lottery judgments. And beyond the original cognitive heuristics 
identified, there are also now the affect heuristic (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & S. M. 
Johnson, 2000) and the somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996), 
which substitute affect and emotional processes for intuitive thinking.  
 
In the domain of gambling, probability judgments and predictions are so universal that 
heuristics for explaining such judgments are powerful and amount to explanations for 
much of gambling behaviour. In gambling research, heuristics have become synonymous 
with erroneous perceptions and distorted cognitions and are implicated in a range of 
literatures beyond psychology. Indeed, the heuristics approach has changed the way that 
clinicians treat patients and envision therapies (Blaszczynski & Silove, 1995; Delfabbro, 
2004; Toneatto & Sobell, 1990; Zangeneh, Blaszczynski, & Turner, 2007) and politicians 
develop policies (Eggert, 2004). 
 
Going beyond heuristics? 
Despite its strengths, the heuristics programme of research has its critics. Does the 
research showing participant blunders demonstrate that people are poor at inductive 
reasoning or that the researchers and their experiments are poor at eliciting accurate 
responses (Cohen, 1981; Gigerenzer, 1991)? Are the experimental tests provided as 
evidence just illusionary circumstances lacking ecological validity (Lopes, 1982)? Might 
participants be simply satisficing (Nisbett & Ross, 1980)? Does the research hold people 
to a reasonable standard (D. F. Barone, Maddux, & C. R. Snyder, 1997)? For a 
comprehensive review of criticisms written by two of the field‘s strongest proponents, 
see Gilovich and Griffin (2002). 
 
But the question of interest for this discussion is whether the heuristics approach is 
appropriate for the study of gambling. Even one of its proponents of applications to 
gambling, Wagenaar (1988), notes that the harsh conclusions drawn of doomed 
irrationality are sometimes unwarranted and asks why, if in everyday reasoning a heuristic 
is considered sensible, is the same reasoning in gambling deemed irrational? He is joined 
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by Corney and Cummings (1985) who also posit that the so-called gambling biases are 
simply the biases of everyday information processing. There is no evidence that irrational 
thinking is related to excessive gambling as the biases are just as prevalent in non-
gamblers as they are in regular gamblers (Delfabbro, 2004; Ladouceur & Walker, 1996). 
And, simply put, gamblers staking large amounts of money have every reason to think 
deliberately rather than intuitively.  
 
Referring back to the agenda stated at the start of this chapter, the field of gambling 
research seeks to address the question of why people continue to gamble despite losses 
and negative expected value. Their answer appears to be simply that erroneous beliefs 
persist, paying no heed to the evidence that people exhibit learning and successful 
decision making in other domains.  And why do gambling problems affect some but not 
all? A core principle implicit in the heuristics and biases account is that people deviate 
from rational choice in predictable and systematic ways (Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p. 1). 
But in some instances there is not even a clear formal concept of what the heuristics are 
or what they predict or when one heuristic might apply to a problem rather than another; 
for example, ―representativeness‖ (Gigerenzer, 1991). The heuristics and biases 
programme has predictability only in hindsight.  
 
Model-based gambling 
A model-based account of decision making applied to gambling behaviour would 
provide a useful and descriptively valid account of decision making. In brief, the model-
based account allows for an agent to hold rich structured knowledge about the 
environment and develop ideas about the hidden processes generating observed 
outcomes, which are both updated by integrating prior beliefs with incoming evidence. 
Such an approach builds on established findings in learning based directly on 
reinforcement learning and also indirectly on schemas and mental models. 
 
Reinforcement learning 
In early conceptions of reinforcement learning, such as those used originally to describe 
trial-and-error learning in animal behaviour, an agent interacts with his environment 
through perception (observing stimuli) and action (responding to stimuli), assuming no 
role for cognition (Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996). Importantly, a consequence of 
this structure is that while the agent observes outcomes in the environment, he does not 
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observe or at least does not record knowledge of the process that produced the outcome. 
The outcome merely adjusts a scalar reinforcement signal (e.g., reward) without 
evaluation that is then used to determine the best next action. This approach grounded in 
statistics has a long history with gambling, including the problem of and solution for 
optimal decision making among slot machines as discussed by Berry and Fristedt (1985). 
Modern theorists now refer to this version as model-free learning.  
 
Model-based reinforcement learning (Chater, 2009; Sutton & Barto, 1998; Sutton, 1991), 
in contrast, is intrinsically concerned with cognition2. It has two premises: the agent 
builds a ―model‖ or explicit internal representation of how the environment works and 
he chooses the action that is best conditional on his current knowledge. This agent is able 
to learn not only about the relationships between outcomes and his own actions but also 
states, or different environments. The model may be influenced by all and any knowledge 
that the agent has, including the history of past actions, outcomes, and states. This model 
amounts to being able to access from memory how to play the game of poker, strategies 
for play and how to implement them, the previous experiences of playing against one‘s 
present opponents, and the second-hand information received from others about playing 
against one‘s present opponents. How the model is updated is not strictly defined; 
however, because information is evaluated and retained, adjustments to models can be 
forward and backward looking as well as global (across multiple domains) or localised. 
The model also has the components of structure, properties, and relations that organise 
an environment required to make causal inductions (T. L. Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005). 
Such an account is far-reaching but also simple enough to cover a range of situations 
under uncertainty. 
 
Schemas and mental models 
To extend the notion of and provide additional support for the psychological validity of 
the model-based approach, a cursory background on the concept of a model or internal 
representation of an external event or idea is warranted. Schemas are structures of 
knowledge that include concepts of components, attributes, and relationships between 
specific instances (Bower, 1981; Pearson, Barr, & Kamil, 1984). Schemas have been 
explored and documented in a range of domains, including person stereotypes and roles, 
                                                 
2 This may be debatable, between the rational and mechanistic perspectives on reinforcement learning (see 
Chater, 2009). However, in this thesis and for the purpose of a multi-disciplinary application to gambling 
research, only the rational approach will be considered here. 
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goal-oriented action sequences, and narratives (for a comprehensive review, see Graesser 
& Nakamura, 1982). Similarly, with mental models, it is argued that people use an 
internal symbolic understanding of the external world. People can only represent small-
scale models of reality, neglecting facts and relationships that are outside their scope of 
knowledge with cascading effects on reasoning (Johnson-Laird, P. Legrenzi, Girotto, M. 
S. Legrenzi, & Caverni, 1999).  
 
The premise underlying these approaches is that cognition is a top-down process, 
whereby attention, interpretation, general impressions, and in-depth reasoning are all 
driven by structured models. Gestalt psychologists argued that the properties of an 
experience could not be inferred from its parts alone; some properties are inferred from 
the prior knowledge of the part. Murphy and Medin (1985) argued that simple feature 
models based on similarity are ineffective as our conceptual systems rely on explanatory, 
causal, teleological and ontological beliefs, such as those represented by top-down 
processing. For example, when reading a story in which the protagonist dines at a 
restaurant, one might not read the explicit description of the customer paying his bill but 
one infers that he has (Pearson et al., 1984). A schema or mental model is the highly-
ordered structure in which the rich knowledge about the game of poker and the typical 
strategies used by other players is stored.  
 
At first, the model-based approach may seem to be a Bayesian in sheep‘s clothing. The 
formula of prior beliefs integrated with evaluated incoming evidence to determine the 
best next action sounds familiar. Indeed, there are examples of model-based learning that 
use Bayesian algorithms to update models (Dearden, Friedman, & Andre, 1999). But the 
differences are significant. Where in Bayesian approaches evidence is used to update a 
distribution of beliefs or hypotheses about the environment, model-based approaches 
update only one or few beliefs about the structure of the environment, within the known 
bounds of cognitive capacity limitations (Doherty & Mynatt, 1986). The updating process 
is also qualitatively different: the model-based learner evaluates incoming evidence to 
adjust his current model of the environment rather than globally assess all observed 
evidence. Consequently, posterior beliefs may not reflect all evidence observed but 
instead be biased by effects of presentation order and framing. A closer look in the 
following section will clarify any confusion. 
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The elements of a model-based account  
The model-based approach to gambling behaviour is built on subjective internal 
representations of the problem and the agent‘s interactions with the environment. It is 
interested in answering the question of how people gamble. It can be depicted as a 
feedback process whereby the outcomes of the agent‘s actions are fed back into the 
agent‘s beliefs about the problem. As more evidence is collected, the agent may confirm 
or adjust his belief about the underlying outcome distribution and outcome-generating 
process. The approach may be as simple as a lookup table or as complicated as a search 
process (for dynamic problems, the agent can learn the transitions between states). At all 
levels of complexity, there are two principle components: 
 
A model, schema, or prior belief about the problem—The agent has a structured 
representation of the problem that reflects the rich prior knowledge and intuitions 
brought to the task. The model includes representations of the states of the environment, 
actions, and rewards and the explanatory, causal, teleological and ontological beliefs 
about the relationships among them; for example, how actions are related to rewards. 
The top-down structure enables the agent to reason broadly about classes and categories 
of events and relationships using prior knowledge as well as in a more detailed manner 
about the specifications of the current problem using data. 
 
A belief-adjustment process—Upon observing new evidence, the agent evaluates the 
information against his prior beliefs, regardless of whether the information was collected 
through active information search or passive observation. Because the prior beliefs 
contain only knowledge and experience available to the agent, the evidence does not 
impact unknown hypotheses. And, as a consequence, learning can be biased by order 
effects. However, because models of the environment are highly structured and include 
histories of previously held beliefs, new information can go beyond adjustments to cause 
qualitative and systemic changes in models. For example, verbal instructions of task 
changes may be immediately implemented without trial-and-error learning (e.g., Bridger 
& Mandel, 1965), retroactively to previous beliefs, and broadly resulting in all-or-nothing 
learning (Gallistel, Fairhurst, & Balsam, 2004). 
 
Critically, as a consequence of these two dissociable components, an agent may appear to 
behave irrationally while implementing rational inference. If the agent‘s model of the 
problem is inaccurate, it may be the case that new evidence does not correct the errors 
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despite the correct implementation of the updating process. The agent may persist in 
believing inaccurate information and acting sub-optimally in the face of disconfirming 
evidence. 
 
Consider an example. Upon encountering a game, the decision making agent immediately 
draws upon prior beliefs to implement his first action. This may include intimate 
knowledge of the game structure or just best-guesses based on environmental cues 
available. The outcome of his action is then fed back to him, and used to update his 
beliefs about the problem he is facing and his best next action, perhaps in the form of 
‗Since 29 was the winning number, I just need to tweak my system a little to make it 
work.‘ Such a system of beliefs accommodates the types of verbalisations reported in 
observations of gamblers, including beliefs about luck and skill. And because the model 
is a subjective internal representation of reality, these beliefs may be held regardless of 
the true chance or skill nature of the game.  
 
Summary  
The field of gambling research from a psychological point of view has been dominated 
by the heuristic and normative points of view. However, neither approach to gambling 
adequately captures the strengths and weaknesses of actual real-world gambling 
behaviour nor provides users of gambling research with a practical means of 
understanding gamblers. Instead, a model-based approach, which puts the individual at 
the centre of a rational process, may bring a new perspective to the field. The following 
chapters will cover gambling tasks that range from simple to complex and use stimuli 
from both the laboratory and the real world to showcase how a model-based account 
improves upon the current thinking of the field. The experimental paradigms and 
discussions will expand upon the ideas introduced here, about model-based decision 
making, models, and updating processes. In every instance, understanding how the 
individual thinks about a gamble will be emphasised. This thesis aims to demonstrate 
that, by applying a model-based learning approach to gambling, we may advance the field 
in new directions.  
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Outline 
Classes of Uncertainty 
 
 
Much of the discussion about games is centred on the evaluation of outcomes, by 
academics and punters alike. Questions often raised are ‗How many times did it come up 
red?‘ or ‗How many times did the individual continue to bet despite losing?‘ But, often 
times, this focus is misguided because of the lack of control over outcome-generating 
processes, such as in games with chance elements. Both groups of academics and punters 
ought instead to be focused on the processes that produce the outcomes. The nature of 
this process informs the predictability of the game‘s outcomes and the rationality of a 
wagering endeavour. This extends to all types of gambles, from the simplest to the most 
complex. In the following sections, I divide uncertainty into three classes in which 
decision making agents do not or cannot assign objective probabilities to actions and 
outcomes: uncertainty with static and known probability distributions, static but 
unknown probability distributions, and dynamic processes. Each is described from the 
established cognitive psychology perspective with examples from games found in the 
literature and casinos.  
 
Fixed and known probability distributions 
In a well-defined outcome space of fixed and known underlying probabilities, outcomes 
are typically considered as risks. Although the outcome-generating process may be 
random, decision making agents faced with risky choices have full information regarding 
the possible outcomes and the likelihoods of these outcomes. There are important 
differences between games such as these played only once or played repeatedly over time. 
In those played over time, because the outcome-generating process is static over time, 
agents can observe evidence and learn about the processes.  
  
Classically, economists and psychologists have represented risk with simple gambles, 
such as the choice between two options (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 264): 
 
 A: 50% chance to win 1,000, B:  450 for sure. 
 50% chance to win nothing; 
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Within a gamble, outcomes are yielded with static and specified probabilities, such that 
the probabilities of each outcome sum to 1, indicating that all possible outcomes are 
known.  
 
Consider the risky gambles offered at a European roulette table. A win is determined by 
the resting position of a ball spun on a wheel; the outcome is the product of a random 
process. The wheel is divided into equal-size areas labelled with 37 numbers, giving each 
area (number) an equal probability of winning. In the format of the gamble above, this 
may be expressed as each number occurring with a probability of 1 in 37 or 0.0270. The 
bets offered at a roulette table range from single numbers (e.g., 24) to large portions of 
the wheel (e.g., even numbers) that have known and calculable odds of winning. In 
principle, roulette offers straightforward risks that people understand.  
 
From the normative position, this straightforward risk of a one-shot gamble has been 
proven to extend to repeated gambles: it can be shown mathematically that the 
unfavourable odds of a gamble are compounded for repeated plays, such that a gamble 
with unfair odds simply remains unfavourable under repeated play (Dubins & Savage, 
1965). Empirically, however, an understanding of straightforward risk over a sequence of 
decisions is often quickly confused by decision making agents. People indicate 
preferences for riskier, lower expected value options when they know they will gamble 
repeatedly, compared to playing single gambles (Coombs & Bowen, 1971). In trying to 
predict or control outcomes, people transform the straightforward proposition of 
repeated risky gambles into a complex learning problem.  
 
One way by which people transform gambles into more complex problems is by putting 
aside the well-known principles of randomness and probability and instead relying on 
previously seen outcomes. People seek—and find—patterns in the data. For example, in 
a game lasting over many roulette spins, a curious punter may find that streaks of reds 
are followed by a black number. Although this pattern may be genuine, it is only a logical 
necessity of the binary nature of the outcome space (aside from the green zero, all 
numbers are either red or black) and does not provide any power in predicting randomly-
generated outcomes. Analysis and discussion of data collected from electronic roulette 
machines in a land-based casino and lab experiments will further explore this concept of 
22 
 
learning under uncertainty with static and known underlying probability distributions in 
Chapter 2.  
 
Fixed and unknown probability distributions 
While a gamble‘s outcomes may be known, as in the simplest class of uncertainty 
problems described above, there are times when the probability distribution underlying 
those outcomes is unknown. This type of uncertainty is often described as ambiguity. 
Decision making agents facing ambiguous gambles do not have full information about 
the likelihoods of outcomes. Effectively, this type of knowledge is analogous to 
ignorance of the outcome generation process—its causal structure, as one example. 
However, given the static nature of the problem, it is theoretically possible to 
approximately learn the probabilities.  
 
In psychology and economics, this type of gambling under uncertainty has often been 
presented in urn experiments. A seminal gamble premise is re-created here (Ellsberg, 
1961, p. 650): 
 
Let us suppose that you confront two urns containing red and black balls, 
from one of which a ball will be drawn at random. To ―bet on RedI‖ will 
mean that you choose to draw from Urn I; and that you will receive a prize a 
(say $100) if you draw a red ball... and a smaller amount b (say $0) if you draw 
a black... Urn I contains 100 red and black balls, but in a ratio entirely 
unknown to you; there may be from 0 to 100 red balls. In Urn II, you 
confirm that there are exactly 50 red and 50 black balls.  
 
Within an ambiguous gamble, the relevant probabilities are unknown. In this example, 
the decision making agent has no information about the likelihood of drawing a red or 
black ball from Urn I, in contrast to the full information about the likelihoods for Urn II 
(which is an example of the class of uncertainty with static and known probability 
distributions). 
Consider the gamble offered by slot machines, fruit machines and poker machines. These 
machines typically offer a video interface of five reels of symbols that spin and come to 
rest showing combinations of symbols. A spin‘s payout is determined by the matching of 
symbols on the played payout lines to the machine payout table‘s set of winning 
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combinations. For example, if there are three cherry symbols along a payout line, the 
punter receives the prize associated with that combination. These machines offer a 
limited set of winning combinations; all possible outcomes and winning combinations are 
known but no probabilistic information is available. In the example given, the likelihood 
of three cherry symbols appearing along a payout line is unknown. However, the 
unknown likelihoods do not change over time. In principle, these likelihoods can be 
approximately learned and this class of uncertainty gambles can be transformed into risky 
gambles. 
This class of gambles offers another hook that increases subjective uncertainty when 
considered over time: with unknown underlying probability distributions, false 
probability distributions can be imposed on the gamble. Regardless of any misguided 
belief in illusory correlations based on circumstance or skill, the likelihood of outcomes 
can be incorrectly judged. A combination of small stakes, infrequent and salient prizes, 
and long playing sessions may result in an exaggeration of the frequency of winning; for 
example, the common phenomenon of duration neglect (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993; Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993), whereby one might 
underestimate how long one has been playing or how many small bets or games one has 
played, may result in a belief that large wins occur more frequently than is true. This 
exaggerated likelihood effectively increases the expected value of taking the gamble. 
Analysis and discussion of data collected from lab experiments using simulated slot 
machines and a modelling study will further explore this concept of learning under 
uncertainty with static and unknown underlying probability distributions in Chapter 3.  
 
Dynamic processes 
Gambles with dynamic underlying processes represent the most complex class of 
uncertainty and are qualitatively different from the two presented previously. The 
outcome space may be undefined and the outcome-generating process may be unknown 
and variable at the time of judgment. There are no mathematical calculations for 
determining optimal judgment and decision making. This type of gamble is less 
commonly found in the gambling research literature but is common in everyday life.  
 
Consider handicapping a horse race where the goal is to predict the post-time odds of 
the top-finishing horses. Before the race begins, a variety of information is available, 
including historical statistics on each horse‘s background (e.g., breeding, weight, price) 
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and recent race results (e.g., the purse size of previous races, number of pass attempts). 
However, some other variables have significant effects on the outcome of the race but 
cannot be quantified, such as the horse‘s personality. And, actual race results may be 
partly determined by chance (e.g., unforeseeable collisions). 
 
Ceci and Liker (1986) studied the decision making processes of expert and non-expert 
handicappers using both actual race information and results and experimentally-designed 
hypothetical races. The most significant finding is the characterisation of punters‘ 
cognitive process of modelling the race: seven or more factors about the horses‘ previous 
races are considered, in a process approximating multiple regression with multiple 
interaction terms. Each piece of information is related to another piece, and 
understanding horse racing requires understanding how the information is structured. 
For example, a judgment about the objective record of a horse‘s final speed is qualified 
by the quality of its competitors, the number of pass attempts, its starting position, and 
more. Analysis of the punters‘ verbalisations indicates that schemas are used to create a 
probabilistic construction of the race. Indeed, the skill in the creation and use of accurate 
schemas may be what separates experts from non-experts with equivalent experience. 
 
Although a dynamic outcome distribution cannot be learned with certainty, an ideal 
learner may eventually predict outcomes with more accuracy than by chance or simple 
accumulation of data. Using inferences and hypotheses about the outcome-generating 
process, learners may reach beyond the data to a deeper understanding of the underlying 
processes. Analysis and discussion of data collected from lab experiments using horse 
race and poker game scenarios will further explore this concept of learning under 
uncertainty with dynamic underlying processes in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 2 
Fixed and Known Uncertainty 
 
 
Consider a coin flip. We characterise it as the simplest of processes: throw a coin into the 
air and observe the outcome as either heads or tails with precisely equal chance. Flipped 
once or flipped a thousand times, the likelihood never changes. We rely on it as an arbiter 
of fairness for decisions that we would not leave to our own emotions and biases. But is 
the outcome of a coin flip genuinely without bias? The initial position of the coin, its 
momentum and its environment are all parameters that complicate the process in reliable 
ways (Keller, 1985). The physical deterministic process of the coin flip may result in 
equal likelihoods of heads or tails on average but each has its own biases. Even a coin flip 
is not as straightforward as it seems.  
 
How do decision making agents consider gambles on coin flips? This problem is a subset 
of gambles under fixed and known uncertainty. Available to the agent is complete 
knowledge of the sample space and the static outcome-generating process. While it is 
clear that the agent has the knowledge of the underlying process in this case, it is less 
clear whether he obtains the normative understanding of the process. Effectively, agents 
may be treating these gambles as more complicated problems of uncertainty with 
unknown underlying outcome-generating processes. For example, is the roulette 
calibration slightly biased? Is a streak of outcomes in a quadrant of the wheel evidence in 
support of a biased wheel or just a random occurrence? Interpreting the formal problem 
and processing evidence are two points at which agents might diverge from the 
normative understanding and from each other.   
 
Interpreting the problem 
According to probability (rational) theory, probabilities of events can be inferred in an 
extensional way: the probability of a set of events occurring is determined by its members 
and therefore the judged likelihood of a set of events should be the same whether elicited 
as a whole or in parts. However, it has been shown that the extensionality assumption of 
rational probability theory does not hold true: different framings of a formally identical 
problem change how decision makers judge likelihoods and make choices (Tversky & D. 
J. Koehler, 1994).  
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This finding is simply demonstrated by Johnson and colleagues in an experiment in 
which the researchers offered hypothetical hospitalization insurance for any disease or 
accident or for any reason. (E. J. Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993). The 
latter option – any reason – is the broadest possible coverage option and dominates the 
former option that names only disease or accident. Despite this, participants offered the 
inferior option were willing to pay more than those offered the superior option. This 
phenomenon is also found in the so-called ―law of small numbers‖ whereby people 
expect small samples from random sequences to reflect the overall proportion of 
outcomes from the parent sequence, or, in other words, to be representative (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1971). In both of these examples, decision makers do not obtain the correct 
understanding of the problem described. 
 
Another way to diverge from assumed normative behaviour is to misinterpret the 
underlying randomising process. Implicit in an understanding of a game on offer is an 
understanding of the underlying process that produces the outcomes. One example of 
this is when people believe they have control over outcomes despite the game being 
uncontrollable. In her (1975) paper on the illusion of control, E. J. Langer proposes that 
this bias is based on the confusion between skill games that have a causal link between 
action and outcome and chance games that decidedly do not. In Study 1 of E. J. Langer 
(1975), participants engaged in a task in the presence of a confederate posing as another 
subject. The task to be completed was a game between the two players based on card 
draws with the winner of each round determined by the value of the card drawn; in other 
words, the outcome of each round was random with no skill involved. Before each round 
of card draws, each participant was asked to privately record a wager between 0 and 25 
cents on whether he would win that round‘s game. The experimenters manipulated the 
appearance of the confederate as either dapper (competent appearance) or schnook 
(incompetent appearance). As hypothesised, participants wagered significantly less when 
―competing‖ against a competent person than against an incompetent person. E. J. 
Langer (1975) also demonstrates this finding with other skill-related factors such as 
choice, stimulus or response familiarity, and passive or active involvement. Factors of the 
descriptions of the problem with no bearing on the value of a gamble can have 
significant impacts on behaviour. 
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Learning from random outcomes 
Stripping an experimental task of any resemblance of skill though does not necessarily 
improve decision making. In a simple repeated binary choice probability learning task, 
people demonstrate in another way their preference for structure and meaning in 
outcomes: probability matching. Despite rewards being dependent on the accuracy of 
choices, people tend to make choices that match the choices‘ probabilities of occurring 
and consequently perform poorly (Neimark & Shuford, 1959). As Tune (1964) notes 
about these findings, participants seem to prefer patterns. 
 
Chance-based games are a special case of decision making tasks: there are no meaningful 
patterns or structure to be found. Despite the knowledge that an underlying structure is 
random, participants asked to produce sequences such as outcomes of flips of a fair coin 
consistently produce biased responses. Participants try to ―match‖ their representations 
of randomness and produce over-alternation and locally representative sub-sequences 
(Falk & Konold, 1997; Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Lopes & Oden, 1987; Rapoport & 
Budescu, 1997; see Nickerson (2002) for a comprehensive review of the literature). 
Particularly relevant to gambling are two biases in randomness perception identified in 
the literature as the gambler‘s fallacy and hot hand. The gambler‘s fallacy is the belief that 
chance processes monitor themselves and balance out runs of particular outcomes and is 
common in roulette, slot machine, and other table game players (Delfabbro, 2004; 
Walker, 1992). A run of heads increases the likelihood that the alternative outcome, tails, 
will occur. This belief in negative recency is in direct contrast to a belief in positive 
recency, known as the hot hand. The hot hand is a belief that a run of heads increases the 
likelihood that the same outcome, heads, will occur. For example, after a streak of 
basketball shot successes, fans, coaches, and players alike believe that another success is 
likely to occur next, though the true likelihood of a success is just 50% and is 
independent of previous shots (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985; although see also 
Sun (2004) for arguments that these processes are non-random).  
 
In the examples described above, decision makers fail to understand the options and the 
terms of the gambles offered despite both being clearly expressed and all information 
available. Contrary to normative assumptions, known uncertainty is evidently quite 
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complicated3. People‘s judgments are biased by framing, structure and meaning are 
imposed on randomness, and the same sequence of outcomes can be used to support 
two opposing predictions of what will happen next. The heuristics tradition‘s approach 
to these problems lacks a coherent complete account – representativeness is recruited to 
explain both the gambler‘s fallacy and the hot hand with no unifying theory to a priori 
indicate which. Neither rational choice nor heuristics are able to explain these findings. 
Model-based accounts take a different approach. Because we are concerned with fixed 
and known uncertainty in this instance, these beliefs are deemed erroneous by the 
normative standard, but in domains other than chance where events are not independent 
or uncontrollable, such beliefs may not be fallacious at all but rather adaptive (Ayton & 
Fischer, 2004; Burns, 2003; Estes, 1964; Lopes & Oden, 1987; Taylor & Brown, 1988). 
Indeed, there are many studies showing that beliefs in the causal process underlying the 
production of outcomes are the factors separating the gambler‘s fallacy from the hot 
hand (Ayton & Fischer, 2004; Burns & Corpus, 2004; Caruso, Waytz, & Epley, 2010). 
This suggests players have an awareness of the underlying processes and are reasoning 
about these problems but erroneously applying their everyday knowledge. Upon being 
reminded of the independence between events, players have been found to reduce 
endorsement of erroneous beliefs and reduce motivation to play (Benhsain, Taillefer, & 
Ladouceur, 2004). A model-based approach may explain findings that neither the 
normative or heuristics theories can. 
 
In this chapter, I present data from two new studies that take a different approach to 
understanding how individuals conceive of gambles. In the first study, data from casino 
electronic roulette machines is used to study how agents process evidence (or do not 
process evidence) in a real-world game with their own money at stake. In the second 
study, the appearance of a gamble is experimentally manipulated to test how decisions on 
identical gambles depend on subjective perceptions. Ultimately, this chapter aims to 
motivate the case for a model-based account of decision making.  
                                                 
3 A thought to keep in mind, however, when considering judgments of randomness, is that the nature of 
the process of comparing a hypothesis of random structure to any other structure is that any evidence 
observed will always provide strong support in favour of the alternative hypothesis while no evidence can 
provide strong support in favour of randomness (Williams & T. L. Griffiths, 2008). Finding meaning and 
structure in randomness is not a mere bias but a difficult problem. 
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Study 1 
A Role for Prior Beliefs in Roulette  
 
Chance-based gambles are the paradigmatic tool used by researchers to evaluate the 
rationality of our decisions. These problems are simple to understand and often require 
only one easily-accessible physical process to generate outcomes. The spinning of a wheel 
of ―fortune‖ is one classic example (Coombs, Bezembinder, & Goode, 1967). A wheel of 
(mis)fortune with unfavourable odds is ideal for study because the rational decision is 
clear: do not play. Roulette is one such unfavourable game.   
 
Roulette is a popular table game at casinos that is based on the spinning of a ball on a 
wheel with numbered areas of equal size. Punters place bets on which area of the wheel 
the ball will land in, with both the wheel layout and the betting table layout incorporating 
randomness and patterns such as the placement of the numbers along the wheel and 
along the table and the alternation of black and red and of even and odd.  
 
Despite the randomness built in to the outcome-generating process, strategies for beating 
the game abound. Thousands of websites offer tips and systems that guarantee profits at 
the table games in the casinos and at the gambling sites on the Internet. (While this 
researcher has not personally paid for access to learn these guaranteed-win systems, she 
is certain that the purveyors earn a greater profit from online sales than they do from 
employing the strategies themselves at a casino.) Many players believe they can beat this 
chance-based game despite its negative expected value. How can researchers studying 
gambling understand this divergence from optimality? 
 
Looking for the gambler’s fallacy  
In previous work, a common finding from investigations of wagering on chance-based 
gambles is unwarranted inferences from small samples of randomly-generated data, such 
as the gambler‘s fallacy (a belief that the probability of an event is lowered immediately 
after it occurs) and the hot hand (a belief that the probability of an event is raised 
immediately after it occurs), which are in turn commonly interpreted in light of heuristics 
such as representativeness (a small sample of outcomes is used to infer properties of the 
underlying distribution of the population). Examples of this approach include Kahneman 
and Tversky (1971), Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991), Rabin (2002), Croson and Sundali 
30 
 
(2005), and Barron and Leider (2010). While these studies have greatly advanced our 
understanding of behaviour, they share a common limitation of examining wagers 
conditional on previous outcomes. 
 
For example, classification of a gambler as believing in the gambler‘s fallacy based on 
wagers alone is difficult: there is the unsolvable question of at what level to look for 
correlation to previous outcomes. Straight-up bets on the precise number that previously 
occurred? A different quadrant of the wheel than the previous outcome had landed in? A 
different area of the table layout? When an average of ten bets are being placed per 
person per spin (Croson & Sundali, 2005), it is difficult to assess reliable and meaningful 
dependencies between spins.  
 
Secondly, the approach neglects prior beliefs and individual understanding of the 
problem of uncertainty. Assuming equivalent prior beliefs and interpretations of the 
problem is naive in other areas of research and such an assumption should be considered 
invalid here, too. The approach is akin to believing that all roulette punters come to the 
table with similar beliefs and simply testing whether they all weight incoming evidence in 
the same manner. The present researcher‘s interviews with casino customers indicated 
that punters held different strong beliefs about the game and used different strategies and 
focused on different features of the outcome and the environment. 
 
To overcome this research approach limitation, the present study examines roulette 
wagering data to assess whether all roulette punters use data-based strategies. An 
alternative strategy based on priors will also be considered during classification. It is 
hypothesised that not all participants will exhibit data-based wagering, in support of a 
model-based account of wagering that incorporates prior beliefs. 
 
Overview of dataset 
Electronic roulette machine data were collected from a casino in central London that 
offers a range of table games, including black jack, poker, punto banco, roulette, dice, 
and video gaming machines. The data were recorded manually during non-peak hours of 
operation over several days with the permission and aid of the casino management. 
Wager and outcome information only were recorded; no private or identifying 
information about the customers was included. As with Croson and Sundali (2005) and 
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other field studies, this work also benefits from using field data. Participants in such 
studies stake their own money voluntarily and thus are genuinely incentivised to learn the 
game and make optimal decisions. Additionally, many participants have extensive 
experience with the game of roulette, unlike typical laboratory participants.  
 
In the game of roulette, a win is determined by the resting position of a ball spun on a 
wheel. The wheel is divided into equal-size areas labelled with 37 numbers, giving each 
area (number) an equal probability of winning. At each spin of the wheel, any number 
occurs with a probability of 1 in 37 or 0.027. The bets offered at a roulette table range 
from single numbers (e.g., 24) to portions of the wheel (e.g., 3, 26, 0, 32, and 15) or 
portions of the table and number line (e.g., 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30) that have known and 
calculable odds of winning.  
 
Players must place their bets on the table (or the video machine screen) during the 
allowed period before the spinning wheel begins to slow down. Players may place any 
and as many bets as they wish. The minimum bet size is £1.00 at the roulette tables of 
the casino in this study and £0.50 at machines. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants of this study were customers of a London casino. During piloting, customers 
were approached and asked to participate in a psychology study and many declined (due 
to environmental circumstances, the precise number of participation request rejections 
was not recorded but is estimated to be 75% of those approached). Due to this challenge 
in interviewing customers, the design of this study was modified to analyse machine data 
only. During the later phases of the study, no customers were approached; data were 
collected after customers had left the gaming area. The data collected during these 
separate phases were combined for this analysis.  
 
Of the study‘s 32 participants, 2 participants were removed from analysis because the 
stakes played or the profit won were significant outliers (±2 SD from the mean), leaving 
30 participants in the sample including 6 pilot participants. Only customers playing on 
electronic gaming machines were targeted; no further actions to address the possible 
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differences between punters who play at live table games and those who play at machines 
were taken.  
 
Procedure 
If customers were approached, they were approached only as they exited the gaming 
area. The researcher introduced herself and asked if they would anonymously answer 
questions about their gaming experience for a University College London research study. 
If the customer agreed, the researcher attempted to conduct a structured interview 
including questions about the customer‘s memory for their previous gaming session‘s 
wins and duration. Due to environmental circumstances (e.g., lack of privacy) and the 
sensitivity of the information being sought, several interviews strayed from the structured 
format.   
 
During non-peak hours, the casino management granted the researcher access to the 
electronic roulette machines. Because no identifying information was available at the time 
of collection, the beginning and end of gaming sessions were deduced from wager 
behaviour. For example, long intervals between wagers, different wagering patterns, 
different wager sizes, and insertion of money after a nil balance were used as cues to 
indicate the start of a new session. A session was included in the dataset if it comprised 
more than 3 spins (minimum required for analysis of wagering patterns) but fewer than 
50 spins (to reduce data processing). Relevant data per spin were manually recorded, 
including all bets, the outcome, the value of the punter‘s bank, and the time. 
 
Results and discussion 
Data on wagers and outcomes were recorded from electronic roulette machines to 
investigate strategy use by real-world players in chance-based games with high stakes. 
These data were analysed for wagering patterns within each gaming session and 
summarised across subjects. 
 
The mean number of spins played during a single gaming session was 13 (SE = 1.71). 
The mean amount of money staked by the participants excluding any winnings used to 
continue play was £35.65 (SE = 8.22). The mean take at the end of each gaming session 
was -£8.38 (SE = 9.27). Of the 30 participants in the sample, 7 ended the session in 
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profit (M = £47.00, SE = 20.78), 4 broke even and left the session with their original 
stake amount, and 19 lost money from the session overall (M = -£30.55, SE = 8.63). 
 
Wagering patterns 
Participants‘ strategies were classified according to wagering patterns. Because different 
strategies may manifest in wagering patterns that appear similar and similar strategies may 
manifest in wagering patterns that appear different, precise classification according to 
known heuristics such as the gambler‘s fallacy or win-stay/lose-switch could not be 
completed. Rather, patterns in evidence processing were used for the classification. The 
first wager of a session represented the individual‘s prior beliefs. If more than 75% of 
bets for the majority of games were the same as the bets on the first game, the individual 
was classified as using a prior-based strategy. If bets were inconsistent, the wagers were 
compared to the observed outcomes. If any data-dependencies were found (e.g., 
changing bets to or changing amount staked on the previous game‘s outcome), the 
individual was classified as using a data-based strategy. If bets were inconsistent but did 
not appear to follow outcomes, the individual was classified as ―other‖. Also explained 
below is an additional category that emerged from the analysis as independent of the 
model-based framework of evidence processing. These patterns are described below in 
Table 1.  
 
 Prior-based 
n = 13 
Data-based 
n = 7 
Win-frequency 
n = 6 
Other 
n = 4 
Number of Plays 
12.31 
(2.93) 
12.00 
(3.34) 
15.67 
(4.50) 
11.75 
(2.50) 
Amount Staked 
£21.16 
(4.71) 
£61.65 
(26.52) 
£49.67 
(23.30) 
£23.75 
(5.54) 
Net Take 
-£8.65 
(5.52) 
-£17.14 
(34.31) 
£10.33 
(23.87) 
-£20.25 
(4.09) 
 
Table 1. Summary of wagering behaviour across three different strategies (and other). 
Individuals‘ performances were averaged without weighting the number of plays. Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
Prior-based wagering. These wagers exhibited patterns that indicated prior beliefs about the 
game were used for wagering that were independent of the incoming evidence. Forty-
three percent of the sample was classified as relying heavily on prior beliefs for wagers. 
For example, one participant placed only straight-up bets on 0 for 12 consecutive spins. 
No spin during the session resulted in a zero. This pattern of wagering indicates the 
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participant brought a systematic belief to the table that withstood 11 items of (possibly) 
contradicting evidence. Betting on the same numbers repeatedly expresses a belief that, 
regardless of what the data suggest, the outcome-generating process is due to produce 
those numbers.  
 
Data-based wagering. These wagers exhibited patterns that indicated the participant was 
highly sensitive to previous outcomes but not sensitive to prior beliefs as assessed by 
initial wagers. Although this classification is vague, it is believed that 20% of the sample 
fits this description. For example, one participant observed several times during his 
session that a number or two numbers positioned side-by-side on the table were repeated 
in short succession; he then placed a bet on those numbers, after having not previously 
placed bets on those numbers nor significantly increasing the number of bets being 
placed on the table generally. This pattern of bets suggests that the participant believed 
he could exploit observed dependencies in the outcome-generating process.   
 
While we cannot infer the precise beliefs maintained by the participants in these two 
classifications about their respective roulette games, the different wagering and evidence 
processing methods used indicate that the beliefs about the likelihood of future 
outcomes—and therefore the underlying beliefs about the problem environment and the 
outcome-generating process—differ. In other words, the wagers differ between groups 
because the participants understand the problem of the roulette wheel in different ways. 
 
Win frequency-maximisation wagering. An additional group emerged from the study that had 
not been hypothesised but was clear from the data. Twenty-three percent of the sample 
took on a strategy to maximise win frequency, covering the majority of the table with 
bets but without regard to prior beliefs or incoming evidence. These punters do not 
appear to be aiming for the conventional goal of maximizing profit. Instead, by betting 
on the majority of outcomes possible, these punters appear to aim to ensure a winning 
bet even if the high stakes paid reduce or even negate the winnings collected. However, 
simply ensuring a winning bet is insufficient. If this characterization were true, then we 
might expect to see many punters covering both sides of an outside bet, such as red and 
black, with the table minimum. Instead, these punters typically place straight-up, split, 
and square bets (see Figure 1 for an example), much like other punters, but in large 
quantities while risking no coverage on other numbers. This pattern indicates the punter 
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does not merely wish to pass the time playing the game for as long as possible but 
instead strategises to experience large wins regardless of the cost. While this pattern 
indicates a degree of reliance on prior beliefs or incoming data for selecting which 
numbers to cover, the overwhelming emphasis is on win frequency-maximisation. 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of a participant‘s win-frequency maximisation strategy. Each circle 
represents a bet; where the circle covers more than one number, the amount wagered is split 
evenly. Across the 37 possible outcomes, the numbers 9 and 31 are not covered by any bets 
but all other numbers have from £0.75 to £11.50 bets. A total of £214.00 was wagered. In 
instances where this strategy is implemented but the total wager is lower, the amount per bet 
decreases, e.g., to a range of £0.50 to £1.50 bets.  
 
This descriptive account of real-world wagering demonstrates that there are clear 
divisions in strategy used by decision makers faced with straightforward chance-based 
gambles. Punters examined in this dataset deviated from randomness in at least two 
systematic ways: relying on prior beliefs and strategies despite incoming evidence or 
relying on incoming evidence with no clear dependencies on prior beliefs. Contrary to 
the assumptions of much of previous work, the majority of players in the dataset 
appeared to place bets independent of the incoming evidence. Indeed, to believe 
otherwise would amount to expecting everyone at a table to bet largely the same way. 
This division also indicates a deep difference in how the participants perceive the 
underlying outcome-generating process that they are wagering on. Those punters whose 
wagers reflect their prior beliefs may believe they can control the outcome or that they 
have a knowledge edge over the house; they may be willing to eat losses without 
changing their strategy because they understand randomness affects outcomes and the 
predicted payoff is still yet to come. Those punters whose wagers reflect the incoming 
evidence may believe that they can match the observed probabilities to exploit biases in 
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the outcome-generating process. These are just two interpretations that capture the 
important differences in the wagering patterns found here but there are as many 
strategies as there are players. This analysis shows that researchers studying gambling 
must consider individual beliefs even for problems as straightforward as roulette. 
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Study 2 
More Than One Way to Throw the Dice  
 
As was shown in the previous chapter on roulette play in a casino, people maintain 
strikingly different beliefs despite years of feedback and knowledge of a well-known 
game‘s randomising process. In this study, I aim to revisit one of the commonly cited 
causes for this behaviour - the illusion of control bias.  
 
An illusion of skill 
The research into the illusion of control bias suggests that the inclusion of skill-related 
factors in a game induces a skill orientation and consequently an illusion of control, 
despite the game being uncontrollable. There are a number of factors that have been 
shown to induce this illusion: choice, stimulus or response familiarity, passive or active 
involvement, competition (E. J. Langer, 1975); more frequent successes early on in play 
(E. J. Langer & Roth, 1975); more frequent successes at any time (Alloy & Abramson, 
1979).  
 
Studies investigating the decision makers‘ thought processes may explain these results. 
There is some evidence to support an account of decision making in chance-based 
gambling that goes beyond the resemblance to skill-based games and considers the 
perceptions of the decision makers. Analysis of verbalizations made by slot machine 
players finds a correlation between the amount of money staked and the number of 
thoughts spontaneously verbalised, with the majority of thoughts being false statements 
about control over outcomes (Delfabbro & Winefeld, 2000). This study suggests that 
players perceive a representation about how the slot machine outcomes are produced 
that does not match reality.  
 
However, subtle interventions have been shown to reveal an awareness of reality. A 
study of the thoughts expressed by regular gamblers shows that participants‘ risk-taking 
behaviour was dependent on the beliefs expressed by an accomplice: statements about 
luck and skill induced more play while statements about chance (e.g., ―it‘s too bad that 
we don‘t control chance‖) induced relatively less play (Caron & Ladouceur, 2003). And 
Martinez, Le Floch, Gaffié, and Villejoubert (in press) demonstrate that observing 
another player‘s successes leads to increased belief in control over the game but when the 
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other players‘ successes are attributed to luck, the increase is eliminated. These studies 
illustrate that individuals seem able to rationally use information about games. And, the 
illusion may be eliminated in multi-shot gambles (J. J. Koehler, Gibbs, & Hogarth, 1994), 
when playing with high stakes (Dunn & Wilson, 1990), and when experiencing early 
losses (E. J. Langer & Roth, 1975). Resemblance to skill cues is insufficient for explaining 
the bias.  
 
A model of skill 
A model-based account, in contrast, examines the agent‘s underlying belief about the 
game and predicts that it is the agent‘s model of the outcome-generating process and not 
simply the appearance of skill per se, that induces willingness to gamble. If the agent 
believes he has at least some control over the outcome—through skill cues, most likely—
he may play. These predictions are aligned with the original illusion of control 
hypothesis.  
 
However, increasing skill perceptions may also induce a decreased willingness to gamble. 
By examining the agent‘s underlying model or beliefs about the uncertainty of the 
gamble, it becomes evident that the relationship can be non-linear. If the agent perceives 
that the outcome-generating process is exceedingly complex and impenetrable to his 
control—again, through skill cues, most likely—he may not play. In contrast to the 
original illusion of control hypothesis that increased resemblance to a skill-based game 
leads to an increased willingness to gamble, a model-based account hypothesises that 
willingness to gamble decreases as the perceived complexity of the outcome-generating 
process exceeds perceived control. This is similar to the control heuristic account posited 
by Thompson, Armstrong and Thomas (1998), whereby the bias relies on perception of 
intentionality and perception of connection between action and outcome. These two 
ideas share a concept of subjective mental representations of the outcome-generating 
process.  
 
The present study compares the model-based account as described above to the 
traditional skill-based account, which predicts that perceived control and willingness to 
gamble follow a linear relationship, whereby increased perceived control induces 
increased willingness to participate in chance-based gambles. 
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For our study of decision making in chance-based gambling we must first make an 
assumption: the agent‘s choice to participate in a negative expected value gamble is 
assumed to indicate his belief that there is unknown uncertainty in the outcome-
generating process. That is to say, the agent who chooses to play believes there is more 
to the game than just randomness. We have seen positive evidence for this assumption 
earlier in this chapter in the analysis and discussion of casino roulette wagers. Although 
participants of games such as these or national lotteries may claim to play for social and 
personal benefits, many employ strategies and maintain beliefs that suggest they perceive 
some amount of control over outcomes (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996). We believe this is a 
reasonable assumption. For those agents who play exclusively for social and personal 
benefits, an entirely different model comprising excitement and passage-of-time may 
apply to their perspective of the game; we are not concerned with these non-economic 
factors in this discussion. 
 
Given this assumption, choosing to play a negative expected value gamble demonstrates 
a belief of some degree of control over the gamble‘s outcome. A punter who repeatedly 
puts down chips on the roulette table believes it is possible to gain an edge over the 
house and make at least a marginal profit. In previous research, choosing to play a 
negative expected value game has been used to assess willingness to gamble, as in E. J. 
Langer (1975). 
 
Overview of experiment 
Participants attempted to predict the outcome of a die throw as many times as they 
wished. For all participants, the game‘s outcome is ultimately determined by the throw of 
a single die and has the same negative expected value regardless of experimental setup; in 
formal terms, each participant was offered the same gamble on the outcome of the throw 
of a single die. However, it was predicted that participants‘ willingness to gamble would 
be better predicted by their perceived control over the game‘s outcome rather than the 
game‘s resemblance to skill games.    
 
The game cost 10 pence to play and paid at 4:1 odds; an example explained that upon 
correctly predicting the outcome, the participant would collect 50 pence, including the 
original stake of 10 pence, for that die throw. The game continued until the participant 
chose to quit. All participants received the same instructions. While not stated explicitly 
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in the instructions, the gamble offered was based on chance and had a significant house 
edge, because the outcome was ultimately determined by the throw of a die and actual 
winning odds were 5:1 but payout odds were set at 4:1. 
 
Method 
Design and materials 
The experiment tested the relationship between the perceived control required to 
complete the task and willingness to gamble. The perceived control required to complete 
the task was manipulated by increasing the complexity of the choice set. The design 
comprised a single between-groups factor with three levels of perceived control required 
to complete the task: no control, attainable control, and unattainable control.  
Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition and remained unaware 
of any alternative task specifications. In each condition, participants were informed that 
their compensation would depend on the outcomes of the decisions and choices they 
made in the task. 
 
All dice used in the task were fair six-sided dice of identical size varying only in colour. 
One group of participants was presented with six dice comprising three green dice and 
three blue dice. From these dice, participants could choose one die to be thrown by the 
experimenter (this choice was repeated, with replacement, for each die throw of the task). 
A second group of participants was presented with the same six dice but were unable to 
choose which die to throw; the die was drawn blindly by the participant from an opaque 
sack out of the six possible dice. The first group, with a choice of which die to throw, is 
labelled the ―attainable control‖ group and the second group, with no choice, is labelled 
the ―no control‖ group. A third group of participants was presented with 50 dice, 
including the 6 dice seen by the other groups and also additional dice of orange, red, 
black, and white colours (5 different colours). This group, with the choice of which die to 
throw from a complex choice set, is labelled the ―unattainable control‖ group.  
 
For comparison to previous literature, these experimental groups may be reinterpreted in 
the language of the illusion of control hypothesis: ―no control‖ (blind draw of 1 out of 6 
dice), ―low degree of control‖ (choice of 1 out of 6 dice), and ―high degree of control‖ 
(choice of 1 out of 50 dice).  
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Participants 
Thirty-five participants were recruited to participate in a paid study on gambling from the 
University College London Psychology Department Subject Pool, Gumtree (a popular 
online UK notice board), and local newspapers. Outliers based on number of die throws 
played (± 2 SD) were removed; this resulted in one participant, who chose to play for 40 
throws, being removed. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, resulting in a 
final sample of 12 participants in the group designed to perceive no control, 11 perceived 
attainable control, and 11 perceived unattainable control. 
 
Inventories were administered after the task to measure numeracy and gambling problem 
severity (see Appendices 1 and 2). This sample of participants scored 86.12% (SD = 
3.44%) on the numeracy scale, where 100.00% reflects a perfect score, and 2.85 (SD = 
0.63) on the problem gambling severity index, where a score above 2.00 reflects potential 
gambling problems. 
 
Procedure 
This experiment was run in conjunction with three unrelated experimental tasks on 
gambling. The tasks were administered in the same order for all participants; this 
experiment was run second in the series, following a task for which participants viewed 
videos of horse races and made wagers on which horse they believed would win. It is 
assumed there are no carryover effects between experimental tasks. 
 
At the start of this task, participants were seated at a table with instructions and dice, 
which were laid out according to the specifications of the randomly assigned condition. 
The instructions, which were the same for all participants regardless of experimental 
condition, described the game, the cost to play, the payout odds, and an example 
outcome. The instructions also explained that participants were not obliged to play the 
task and could choose to pass without penalty; this was emphasised orally by the 
experimenter because pilot participants indicated they felt an obligation to participate. 
 
If a participant chose to not gamble, the dice and instructions were removed and the next 
task was administered. If a participant chose to gamble, the task followed the 
specifications of the assigned condition. After each die throw, the experimenter recorded 
the outcome and offered another die throw at the same cost and payout odds. If the 
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experimental condition required drawing or choosing a die, the draw or choice was 
repeated for each throw, with replacement. The task continued as long as the participant 
wished to play. 
 
Results 
In this experiment, a between-subjects design compared the willingness to gamble of 
participants in each of three groups, measured by the number of times the participants 
chose to play the dice game. Critically, the game presented to each group was the same: 
to predict the outcome of a single die throw. The three groups‘ games were varied only 
on how participants conceived of their control over the outcome-generating process. If 
the participant chose to play the game, the number of times the participant chose to play 
was recorded; otherwise, the measure was recorded as zero. 
 
The mean number of times participants chose to play overall across the three conditions 
was 3.88 (SE = 0.71). The mean number of wins by individuals was 0.68 (SE = 0.20). 
Group means are shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean number of plays (and standard error bars) for each experimental condition.  
 
 
Overall, the model-based account predicts a non-linear relationship between perceived 
control as manipulated in the experiment and willingness to gamble, in contrast to the 
illusion of control hypothesis that predicts an increasing linear relationship. Orthogonal 
contrasts testing the relationship between perceived control and willingness to gamble 
across the three groups support the model-based account: the group that was designed to 
perceive full control over the outcome gambled more frequently than the other groups 
combined (Beta = 0.34, p = 0.05); the linear contrast testing the illusion of control 
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hypothesis was not supported (Beta = 0.10, ns). However, the overall model did not 
reach significance (F(2,31) = 2.28, p = 0.12). 
 
The addition of a covariate measuring the number of correct winning predictions 
significantly increased explanatory power (Beta = 0.67, p < 0.001; R-square change = 
0.42, F change (1,30) = 29.35, p < 0.01) and the predicted non-linear relationship 
remained significant. The addition of parameters for numeracy and gambling problem 
severity did not significantly improve the model.   
 
To analyse the effect of early wins on willingness to continue gambling, participants who 
had correctly predicted at least one die throw within the first three throws (13 
participants) were compared to those who had chosen to play but not won a die throw in 
the same period (11 participants). Groups were no different from each other in terms of 
mean gambles taken (early wins: M = 5.55, SE = 1.50; no early wins: M = 5.46, SE = 
0.83; F(1,23) = 0.003, ns). 
 
Discussion 
This experiment manipulated participants‘ conceptions of uncertainty by varying only the 
framing of a chance-based gamble to understand the relationship between the task‘s 
resemblance to skill and willingness to gamble. Despite each group of participants facing 
the same gamble on a single die throw, manipulations of perceived control created 
significant differences.   
 
While the gamble offered to each group of participants was formally identical, the 
framing was varied in an ordinal manner that meaningfully overlapped with perceived 
control: a game that offered no control equated to having no control over the outcome-
generating process; a game that offered a few choices and some degree of control 
equated to requiring attainable control over the outcome; and a game that offered many 
choices and a high degree of control equated to requiring an unattainable level of control 
over the outcome. As hypothesised, a model-based account of decision making predicted 
participants‘ willingness to gamble better than resemblance to a skill-based gamble. 
 
By simply increasing the number of choices available and therefore complicating the 
participants‘ models of the underlying outcome-generating process, we found a non-
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linear relationship with perception of skill required and willingness to gamble. Participant 
willingness to play was not dependent on the simple absolute number of options and 
semblance to skill. It appears that the framing of the dice influenced participant 
understanding of the process by which outcomes were produced. Even in an 
environment with clear and simple rules such as a die throw, individuals‘ perceptions of 
the underlying process are critical in understanding behaviour.  
 
The number of successful wins during play also had a significant correlation with the 
participants‘ willingness to gamble. Although the causal direction of the relationship 
remains uncertain, the absence of a significant increase in number of games played due to 
early wins suggests that any illusion of control or mastery over the game is not a factor in 
willingness to gamble. Rather, it seems that willingness to gamble is largely dependent on 
the gamble offered.  
 
Although this study was completed with real dice and real monetary consequences, 
participants in this laboratory experiment did not face the prospect of overall losses. 
Some participants expressed a feeling of obligation to play as part of the experiment 
while some others played for fun rather than to maximise payments. However, it is not 
expected that these participants affected the validity of the findings presented here as 
participants were randomly assigned to conditions.  
 
Further research with this paradigm should increase the sample size used to increase 
power and reach a significant relationship between the groups. Also, manipulating larger 
and smaller perceived differences between the framings of the dice may produce 
interesting results for identifying boundary conditions.  
 
In summary, this result provides evidence in favour of a theory of decision making in 
gambling that is grounded in subjective models of the underlying uncertainty. The 
artificial differences in game framing led participants to perceive the game and their 
chances of winning differently. In support of the previous literature discussed, decision 
makers appear to use environmental cues (dice framing) and outcomes (wins and losses) 
to develop beliefs about gambles that may be altogether unrelated from the gambles‘ true 
underlying processes. The effects of such mental representations in even a clearly 
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chance-based environment indicates that studying optimal decision making under more 
complicated circumstances may be more challenging than normative models assume.  
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Chapter 3 
Fixed and Unknown Uncertainty 
 
 
Consider now a second coin. This coin is different from the one considered at the start 
of the previous chapter: it is slightly heavier on one side. The decision making agent is 
aware that this coin is systematically biased but does not know the precise amount, unlike 
in the case of a fair coin for which the bias is zero. Although the formal problem 
presented in a gamble based on a coin of unknown bias is solvable4, the problem is 
immediately made more complex than the known bias version.  
 
Gambles of unknown but fixed uncertainty are effectively inference problems in which 
learning about hidden underlying outcome distributions and outcome-generating 
processes requires generalising from samples. The agent‘s learning over an accumulation 
of evidence—including how evidence is collected, processed, and retrieved from 
memory—becomes critical for judgment and decision making. There are many factors 
that must be evaluated and integrated: the knowledge that the agent brings to the 
problem, the incomplete description of the environment provided, possibly limited 
sampling of the action-outcome space, and hypotheses and beliefs conditional on these 
outcomes.  
 
Beliefs about future events 
Before taking a gamble, a decision making agent, it is assumed, considers whether he will 
win money and rejects unfavourable gambles. Most would agree that the likelihood of 
one‘s lottery ticket winning is next to nil. But people who purchase lottery tickets must 
believe there is at least some likelihood that their ticket might win. Intuitively, this belief 
is a matter of degree – I am more likely to be struck by lightning than to win the lottery. 
What does the agent have in mind when purchasing a lottery ticket? 
 
Up to this point, probabilities and beliefs about probabilities have not yet factored into 
this discussion of decision making in gambling. As the content matter shifts to examining 
the cognitive processes underlying the behaviour observed in Chapter 2, probabilities 
                                                 
4
 However, the decision making agent may never know that he has solved the problem and converged on 
the correct bias value. 
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become more relevant. It is a topic of debate whether it is appropriate to use a 
probabilistic approach when studying human decision making (Harman, 1986; Kyburg, 
1961; Oaksford & Chater, 2007). In the lottery example, however, it seems clear that 
decision makers do consider future uncertain events with degrees of belief. The 
probabilistic approach holds in the weak sense, whereby decision makers understand 
some events are more likely than others, but also in the strong form, whereby people use 
probabilities to represent future events and estimate expected value. For example, using 
the odds information from a bookmaker requires at least an understanding of 
probabilities. For the remainder of the thesis, I put aside the issue of whether the 
probabilistic approach is appropriate. The arguments for and against stray into the 
philosophical realm and, for my intentions, confuse the issue at hand.  
 
Instead, I will focus on how gamblers use probabilities—when aggregated from 
experience—in their decision making. The following studies will explore how decision 
makers represent and utilise probabilities. We will be interested in not only the judgments 
and decisions that agents make but also how the agent arrives at that decision. 
 
A primer on slot machines 
Hidden behind the interfaces of video lottery terminals, poker machines, fruit machines, 
slot machines, and one-armed bandits are the mechanisms that determine whether the 
outcome of a play is a win or a loss. Much like dice and roulette games, slot machines are 
based on chance, with odds stacked in the house‘s favour. However, unlike dice and 
roulette games, the precise odds and how they are calculated are not transparent. While a 
die has six sides each with equal likelihood of landing face-up, a slot machine has an 
unknown number of symbols in unknown locations and ratios on each reel and an 
unknown algorithm determining the outcomes. In brief, a slot machine is an extremely 
difficult type of inductive inference task. And millions of punters on the Internet and in 
casinos and pubs try daily to solve it without success.  
 
At most machines today, the only information known to players is a long-run payout 
percentage and a succinct payout table that lists which outcomes are associated with 
which combinations of symbols (or, as they might have you believe: which combinations 
of symbols cause which outcomes). Random number generators and proprietary 
algorithms provide the uncertainty element of the game. With hidden outcome-
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generating processes and incomplete information about the outcome distribution, 
unknown uncertainty is both the appeal and the curse of these machines, as it is difficult 
to predict future outcomes and understand the consequences of one‘s actions. Because it 
is true that some outcomes are more or less probable than others, with particularly 
desirable outcomes being particularly less probable, it is not difficult to see how a player 
might mistakenly interpret the underlying outcome-generating process to include skill. 
Indeed, among some gamblers, successful play is considered a skill; M. D. Griffiths 
(1990), in a study analysing the verbalisations of slot machine players, found that players 
attributed wins to experience and skill.  
 
In this chapter, I focus on how decision makers learn about hidden probability 
distributions and processes under unknown uncertainty. I present data from two new 
experimental studies and a modelling simulation. All experimental studies use a computer 
simulation of a slot machine (also known as a fruit machine), which has a fixed random 
outcome-generating process but hidden outcome probability distribution. The first study 
examined retrospective judgments based on small samples to understand how memory 
and experience feed into inference about the future. The second study manipulated 
participants‘ prior knowledge about the outcome space to study the online updating of 
hypotheses in a task to learn an underlying probability distribution. A modelling 
simulation further explores how hypothesis evaluation contributes to the shaping of 
subjective probabilities. These experiments aim to examine the processes underlying 
subjective beliefs and repeated decision making over time.   
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Study 3 
Remembering to Lose from Slot Machines 
 
 
Memory is a major part of our judgment and decision making but is also one of the most 
malleable and dynamic processes in cognition. Appreciating how it contributes to beliefs 
about gambles is critical for advancing this discussion on gambling judgments and 
decisions. In this study, I present an experimental task with both objective and hedonic 
value to understand how decision makers process evidence for subsequent judgments 
and decisions. 
 
Through interviews with slot machine players and observation and cataloguing of their 
verbalisations during play, several conclusions about how gamblers think about the slot 
machines have emerged: punters play ―with‖ money rather than ―for‖ money; punters‘ 
primary goal is to make their money last for as long as possible rather than to gain as 
much as possible; and punters are aware of the negative expected value and chance 
elements of the games they play (Delfabbro, 2004). Studies of arousal confirm that 
regular gamblers have increased heart rates during and after play and particularly after 
wins, near-misses, and specialist play characteristics such as nudge and bonus features 
(Moodie & Finnigan, 2005). Research using clinical and physiological data supports this 
idea that monetary losses are the price paid for the excitement of gambling (Bruce & J. E. 
V. Johnson, 1995; Gilovich & Douglas, 1986; M. D. Griffiths, 1993). Slot machine play, 
it would seem, is about the experience.  
 
The peak-end rule 
An essential distinction here is between instant and remembered utility. While instant utility 
is the pleasure or pain we feel at a moment—a fleeting feeling that is replaced by the next 
moment‘s instant utility—remembered utility is the global assessment we make 
retrospectively that encompasses those moments and becomes our memory for the 
experience. While both are useful constructs in their own right, a conflict between the 
validity of a person‘s total utility (sum of instant utilities) and remembered utility of an 
experience emerges when evaluating temporally-extended outcomes, or experiences that take 
place over time (Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997). 
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Previous experimental research has explored the instant and remembered utilities of 
temporally-extended outcomes in a range of contexts, including film clips (Fredrickson & 
Kahneman, 1993), medical procedures (Redelmeier & Tversky, 1996) and sounds 
(Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000). In these experiments, researchers arrived at three main 
findings: the peak-end rule and its two related effects of duration neglect and violations 
of monotonicity.  
 
The peak-end rule states that a simple average of the instant utilities (or disutilities) felt at 
the peak intensity of an experience and at the end of an experience determines the global 
assessment given retrospectively. For example, consider Redelmeier and Kahneman 
(1996), a study of patients‘ retrospective evaluations of colonoscopies. Patients 
experienced the same routine procedure, but doctors prolonged the experience for some, 
adding additional pain at a lower intensity. Although the patients in the shorter procedure 
group experienced objectively less pain, they rated their experience more negatively than 
the patients in the longer procedure group. Patients‘ memories for the pain felt during 
the colonoscopies matched a peak-end average better than an aggregation of total 
disutility. 
 
While previous research has provided strong evidence for the peak-end rule and 
catalogued its factors and behaviour to some depth (see Schreiber and Kahneman 
(2000)), there still remain questions about its determinants and applicability. The research 
field to this point has focused on passively experienced and primarily sensory stimuli to 
evoke hedonic responses, such as colonoscopies and aversive sounds. But there is an 
interesting and still novel area of research in the interaction between hedonic and 
monetary utility in gambling. 
 
Sequences of monetary gains or losses are common experiences in the real world. 
Regular bills and payments are ubiquitous and the ability to make accurate retrospective 
judgments about them may have a serious impact on our decision making. Economic 
theory would have our judgments of monetary sequences follow normative rules, such as 
the average or total amount of money gained or lost; rational people prefer more money 
to less. T. Langer, Sarin, and Weber (2005) tested this concept and observed that, rather 
than use normative rules, people overweighed peak-end values. However, the result was 
not found in tasks of little affective experience; the effect was strongest on performance-
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based tasks. The extension to monetary sequences is still unclear. Gambling outcomes 
are yet more ambiguous: gambling has acutely hedonic wins and losses but also cognitive 
biases such as illusion of skill, tendency to scrutinise losses, or inclination to transform 
losses into ―near-misses‖ (Gilovich, 1983; Reid, 1986) that modify the hedonic profile of 
a temporally-extended outcome away from its monetary values.  
 
Estimation of monetary sequences  
The objective nature of monetary stimuli broadens the scope of possible analyses beyond 
that of previous research. In addition to peak-end choice evaluations comparing 
sequences, these experiments can also examine numerical estimation, a concept critical to 
gambling judgments and decisions. 
 
Most of the numerical estimation literature focuses on numerosity or magnitude, largely 
neglecting the problem of arithmetic involving sequences. Results from T. Langer, et al. 
(2005) suggest that subjects keep running totals, but this was found for sequences of 10 
or fewer numbers under the explicit direction to attend to the sequences. It is still 
unknown how subjects evaluate longer trials, which resemble real world scenarios that 
persist beyond 10 instances (a session at a fruit machine might continue beyond 100 
spins). 
 
Results from this study may also inform current debates on how sequences of evidence 
are encoded in memory. If estimations are reasonably accurate despite extremely high 
peak and end values, the findings may support the notion of an eager learner who 
updates beliefs in an online manner. In contrast, if the peak-end hypothesis is supported, 
the findings may suggest a lazy memory-based learner whose judgments are affected by 
availability and saliency of data in memory.  
 
 
Overview of experiment 
To study how decision making agents generalise from small samples and make judgments 
about their environment, a within-subjects design compared retrospective judgments 
about slot machines after short sessions of play. Machines used different outcome 
distributions from which to generate payouts. In particular, a machine with isolated 
extremely high values was pitted against one that was free of such extremely high values 
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but paid more in total. Normative reward maximizing behaviour (e.g., using a rule such 
as maximising total session payout) predicts a preference for any sequence with a higher 
overall reward regardless of the features of the sequence. In contrast, a heuristic account, 
such as the peak-end rule, predicts that extremely salient positive ―peak‖ moments of the 
experience bias preferences and estimation judgments. 
 
Participants played computer-simulated slot machines. The simulation appeared to 
function like an actual slot machine, though running on a conventional PC. Participants 
clicked a button to activate the spinning of the machine‘s reels and several seconds later, 
when the reels came to a stop, the value of points awarded based on the combination of 
symbols was shown; there was no cost to play. The program then waited for the 
participant to play again. The machine did not show cumulative winnings.  
 
The task included blocks of 2 sequences with 25 trials each. Within a block, participants 
played a sequence of 25 trials from a slot machine followed by a sequence of 25 trials 
from a different slot machine, before providing evaluations of the pair of machines, 
including total payout received and preferences. The task included several experimental 
manipulations but only the two most relevant to the aims of this paper will be presented 
here; the findings reported generalise to the study overall. 
 
Method 
Design and materials 
A within-subjects design that manipulated the outcome distributions underlying slot 
machines was used. Judgments of total pay and preference for machine were collected. 
This study tests whether the presence of high peak values affects the accuracy of 
retrospective judgments of a sequence of outcomes compared to performance on a 
neutral sequence. 
 
One sequence was designed to have high ―peak‖ or ―jackpot‖ values at the middle (serial 
position 12 out of 25; value of 50 pence) and end (serial position of 25; value of 25 
pence), with the remaining 23 outcomes sampled from a limited outcome space to 
maintain a fixed level of total payout constant across all participants. This sequence was 
pitted against a neutral sequence, which comprised outcomes sampled from a limited 
outcome space with no extreme payouts to maintain a fixed level of total payout constant 
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across all participants that was higher than the paired peak sequence. It also tested 
whether participants preferred the high peak values, despite the peak sequence‘s lower 
overall pay; the skewed sequence paid 19.35% fewer points than the control sequence 
paired with it. Another block of sequences was administered to serve as a control 
measure of how participants evaluated a pair of sequences without any extreme values. 
The payout discriminability between sequences was controlled in all blocks and levels of 
accuracy in judgments of total payouts and proportions of the sample choosing the 
higher-paying sequence were used as standards of performance for the paradigm. 
Presentation of the two blocks was counterbalanced. 
 
Participants 
Seventeen participants were recruited via the UCL Psychology Subject Pool and told they 
would receive a fixed payment for their time and an opportunity for bonus pay 
dependent on performance in the experiment.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were told they would play virtual slot machines on the computer and 
afterwards answer questions about their experience. The computer program presented 
instructions for operating the slot machines and provided a payout table listing the 
combinations of symbols and their payouts. Participants were permitted as much time as 
needed to understand the task. During the fruit machine session, the participants 
controlled the speed at which play progressed, but the duration of presentation of 
payouts remained constant at 1.5 seconds. The end of the first sequence in a block of 
was followed by a short break of a blank screen before the start of the second sequence. 
After completing the second sequence of a block, the program prompted the participant 
to answer evaluation questions, one at a time, in a random order except with the 
preference question (at which machine they preferred to play an additional high stakes 
session) always appearing last. 
 
Results 
Percent error is used in these analyses rather than absolute points because the payout 
totals varied across sequences; errors measured by percentages enables a standard for 
comparison.  
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Estimations of total pay 
In the control condition, participants were able to distinguish between the two sequences 
and correctly identify which was higher-paying (difference in total payout between 
sequences of 30 points; higher-paying: M = 128.52, SE = 9.80; lower-paying: M = 96.53, 
SE = 9.05; F(1,16) = 38.47, p < .001, ŋp
2 = 0.71). Participants‘ estimates of total payouts 
of both sequences were significantly lower than actual sums (higher-paying sequence: 
t(16) = 2.70, p = .02; lower-paying sequence: t(16) = 3.14, p = 0.01) with an average 
underestimation error of 19.97% (SE = 4.8%). The magnitude of these errors did not 
significantly vary between sequences (F(1,16) = 2.29, ns). These data are illustrated in 
Figure 3 on the left-side panel. This analysis provides confidence in people‘s ability to 
discriminate between higher- and lower-paying sequences and to make reasonably 
accurate judgments regardless of high or low absolute payout in this paradigm.  
 
 
Figure 3. Percent error in mean participant estimates compared to observed sequence for 
each participant. Negative data points indicate participant underestimation. In the right-side 
panel, the grey bar represents the peak sequence. Error bars show standard errors of the 
means. 
 
 
The same analyses were conducted for the pair of sequences that included a peak 
sequence with extremely high values. Unlike in the control condition, a repeated-
measures ANOVA found that estimates of the sequence sums were not significantly 
different (difference in total payout between sequences of 30 points; higher-paying: M = 
123.94, SE = 9.83; lower-paying: M = 112.24, SE = 6.41; F(1,16) = 3.13, ns). As seen in 
the control condition, the overall estimation of sequence payouts was significantly lower 
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than actual observed payouts (higher-paying: t(16) = 3.67, p = 0.01; lower-paying: t(16) = 
2.77, p = 0.01). These data are seen in Figure 3 in the right-side panel. 
 
To compare judgment performance between conditions with peak values and with 
neutral values, a repeated-measures ANOVA was used with factors of relative payment 
(high or low) and sequence type (peak or neutral). As found in the above analyses, the 
main effect of relative payment was not significant (F(1,16) = 0.31, ns). However, the 
interaction between sequence type and relative payment was significant (F(1, 16) = 7.03, 
p = 0.02, ŋp
2 = 0.31), suggesting that participants evaluated the lower-paying sequence 
differently when it contained extremely high values.  
 
Preferences  
Preference data assessing participants‘ hedonic evaluations confirmed the informational 
estimation findings. In the control condition, all participants preferred the higher-paying 
session, as expected.  
 
Choice data for the peak-end sequence were compared to the control condition. In 
evaluating the pair with a peak-end sequence, five participants chose to play again on the 
machine that paid the peak sequence of payouts, compared to no participants in the 
control condition. Nonparametric analysis found this to be a significant difference (one-
tailed p = 0.03, McNemar test), showing that more participants mistakenly preferred the 
lower-paying session when it contained extremely high payout values. 
 
Discussion 
After observing paired sequences of slot machine outcomes, participants were asked to 
make retrospective evaluations. In each block of two sequences, one sequence paid 
relatively more overall. A control pair of sequences captured baseline performance in the 
task: participants successfully identified which machine of the pair was higher paying but 
committed an overall unbiased error of underestimation of total payout. When observing 
a pair of outcome sequences containing extremely high peak and end values, participants 
committed the same overall underestimation error but reported upwardly biased 
estimations of the sequence sum with high peak and end values. Furthermore, more 
participants preferred the lower-paying sequence when it had high peak and end values 
than when it did not. 
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Overall, participants were poor estimators of sequence sums. With an average 
underestimation of 19.97% in the baseline condition, participants made serious errors. 
Participants did not use the simple arithmetic strategies typically used in addition or 
estimation tasks; however, given that estimations for sums of compared sessions 
reflected actual differences between those sessions, it seems likely that participants did 
use a strategy of some kind.  
 
These findings provide mixed support for the peak-end rule. As the rule predicted, 
participants‘ retrospective estimates of total payout were mistakenly higher for the peak-
end sequence. Additionally, more participants preferred the machine with the extremely 
high values despite its lower payout total, also as the rule predicted. However, the 
positive evidence is weak. In contrast to the qualitative pattern found in previous studies 
whereby the lower-pain sequence with high peak and end values was judged as more 
painful than the baseline control sequence (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996), participants 
here still judged the lower-paying sequence as lower-paying. Additionally, the choice data 
also showed only a weak preference for the machine with the high values with the 
majority of participants still choosing the normatively correct higher-paying option. 
 
The consequences of these findings are at this point limited but, with further research, 
may prove to be important. Actual slot machines typically display cumulative winnings 
on screen, along with other bank information such as credits. Because this experimental 
paradigm does not display cumulative winnings during play, the errors in retrospective 
estimations reported here may be irrelevant. However, in the long-term, once players 
have stepped away from the machine and no longer have such information accessible, 
the peak-end rule may affect subsequent retrospective estimations. Such biased 
judgments may feed into decisions of whether to begin playing again, as Redelmeier and 
Kahneman (1996) found that biased memories of colonoscopy procedures affected 
decisions to repeat the procedure. Indeed, gamblers have been noted to dismiss losses 
but remember wins (Gilovich, 1983); this tendency may interact with the errors in 
retrospective evaluation to escalate the size of the error over time. Future research 
should investigate the duration of the peak-end effect on retrospective evaluations of 
winnings. 
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While several of the results presented here deviate from expectations, the differences 
may be due to translation into a new paradigm. The peak-end rule had not yet been 
tested with gambling wins as in this paradigm, and the weaker findings may be caused by 
paradigmatic limitations. More extreme peak values and longer sequences may shift the 
results. 
 
However, where the normative and heuristic theories fall short in explaining participant 
performance in the present study, an alternative account may be more fitting. Recall that 
participants viewed payout tables at the start of the experimental session that identified 
the range of outcomes possible, including the extremely high values. Neither the 
normative additive or heuristic accounts explicitly consider such environmental cues. If 
the participants enter the task with prior beliefs about the distribution of outcomes they 
are likely to view during the sequence and update these beliefs online as new evidence is 
presented, then retrospective underestimation in control conditions is likely to occur due 
to the absence of the extremely high values. A model-based account provides the 
necessary assumptions to develop this explanation of participant judgments, as does any 
Bayesian account of learning whereby beliefs (but not values, like a cumulative average, 
per se) are updated over time. A connection based on these data is tentative, and testing 
in Study 4 of this chapter will examine the idea further. 
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Study 4 
The Diminishing Value of Expecting a Jackpot 
 
 
From the preceding studies, it has been shown that decision making agents may 
approach the same problem with different models and that these differences result in a 
range of beliefs about the underlying outcome-generating process. The data have also 
shown that the cognitive processes involved in this belief updating cannot be simply 
explained by the rational and heuristic accounts of decision making that are 
conventionally applied to gambling behaviour. In the present study, the process of belief 
updating is examined further to understand how and why slot machine data suggest a 
model-based account of decision making. 
 
 
Hypothesis testing 
In gambling, focal hypotheses are a central part of any gambling decision. Decision 
makers may position thoughts as about a particular outcome and strategies as about their 
own likelihood of winning. If I roll the dice in this way, will I get a seven? A common 
finding in psychological research is the confirmation bias, whereby judgment and 
decision making are biased toward selected focal hypotheses and alternative hypotheses 
are underrepresented. As a consequence of this bias in information search, evidence that 
lowers the likelihood of the focal hypothesis being true or even disconfirms it may not be 
considered (Klayman & Ha, 1987). And as another consequence in hypothesis 
evaluation, people may believe data directly support a hypothesis when in fact it is not 
diagnostic or more strongly supports alternative hypotheses (Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney, 
& Schiavo, 1979; Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; M. Snyder & Swann, 1978). In some 
instances, decision makers, in taking action based on their focal hypothesis, may come to 
believe the belief is true (rather than merely a hypothesis) and ignore the signals from 
evidence that might indicate otherwise (Gärdenfors & Sahlin, 1982). Nickerson (1998) 
provides an extremely thorough review of the confirmation bias and its applications and 
consequences. 
 
To investigate hypothesis testing in betting judgments, Gibson, Sanbonmatsu, and 
Posavac (1997) asked participants to consider four basketball teams in a computer-
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simulated tournament. Participants randomly selected a focal team using a spinner board 
and then reported their judgment on the likelihood of that team winning. In one 
condition, participants were prompted to simply judge the likelihood of winning. In a 
second condition, participants were prompted to provide the likelihood assessment and 
also explain how or why the team might win. A control group of participants simply gave 
their estimates for each of the four teams. Participants were then offered the opportunity 
to bet on which of the four teams would win, with all teams being given equal odds of 
winning. Analysis found that likelihood judgments in all conditions were greater than 
chance, demonstrating the bias toward the focal hypothesis even in the absence of 
experimental manipulation. Additionally, both the focal and focal and explanation groups 
were willing to bet more on the focal team than the control group, demonstrating an 
increased motivation to gamble. By focusing on one event, alternative events fell to the 
wayside and consequently estimations of the likelihood of the focal event occurring and 
willingness to gamble on that event increased. 
 
Hypothesis testing and confirmation bias affect not only betting but also affect 
judgments about the outcome distribution underlying a gamble. Consider the task used in 
Troutman and Shanteau (1977): two boxes of red, white, and blue beads in differing 
proportions, 70-30-50 (respectively) in one and 30-70-50 in the other, are shown. Then, 
not knowing from which box beads were drawn from, the participant observes 
sequences of beads drawn with replacement and then must estimate the probability that 
one of the particular boxes was being sampled from. Unbeknownst to the participants, 
the researchers controlled the content of the sequences and ordered the beads to be 
drawn in specific patterns of diagnosticity and nondiagnosticity. Participants‘ likelihood 
estimates demonstrated that irrelevant and nondiagnostic (e.g., blue beads, which were 
equally likely to come from either box) information were used to confirm prior 
hypotheses. However, in control conditions, the same participants demonstrated they 
were aware of the nondiagnosticity of the same information. 
 
Overview of experiment 
This experiment investigates how decision making agents with different experimentally-
induced initial beliefs about outcome distributions update beliefs. Participants played two 
computer-simulated slot machines. For all participants, the machines displayed outcomes 
drawn randomly with replacement from the same hidden underlying outcome 
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distribution. However, only one group of participants viewed an accurate payout table, 
which displayed the machine‘s true outcome space. The other group of participants 
viewed a skewed payout table, which displayed the same payout values as well as 
additional (fictional) higher-value outcomes. Although all participants observed data 
from the same underlying distribution and fictional higher-value outcomes were not 
supported by any data, it was predicted that those participants who were shown a skewed 
payout table with fictional outcomes would maintain different beliefs about the 
underlying outcome distribution and outcome-generating process. Despite the lack of 
diagnostic evidence from the outcomes observed, the participants were hypothesised to 
persist in their belief in the fictional high outcomes. 
 
The slot machines required a 5 pence stake for each play, which was taken from the 
£3.00 bank endowed by the experimenter to the participant at the start of the task. The 
payment of the stake was animated on the screen to emphasise the loss on each play. The 
machines used a random process to select outcomes from a fixed distribution: an 
outcome of 0, 2, 3, 4 or 5 pence with 17.4% probability or 10 pence with 13.0%. The 
expected value of a play at the machine was 3.9 pence, at a loss of about 1 penny given 
the cost to play. Participants played 80 mandatory pulls on the machines and answered 
questions before the start of play, after 30 arm pulls, and at the end after 80 arm pulls; 
machine choice and pace were up to participants but the number of pulls played was 
fixed. 
 
Method 
Design and materials 
The experiment investigated the processes used by decision making agents for making 
inferences about hidden outcome distributions and outcome-generating processes. The 
design comprised a mixed design with one within-subjects factor over time and one 
between-subjects factor with two levels – participants shown an inaccurate, skewed 
description with fictional higher-value outcomes were compared to a control group who 
were shown an accurate description of the outcome space; no participants were shown 
the probabilities associated with the outcomes. Participants were randomly assigned to an 
experimental condition and remained unaware of any alternative task specifications. In 
each condition, participants were informed that their compensation would depend on the 
bank‘s value at the end of the task. 
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Payout tables were viewable before the task began and remained on the screen 
throughout the task except while the participants responded to questions. The tables 
showed the possible outcome values and the combinations of symbols required to obtain 
each outcome. For example, three lemons along the payout line won two pence. A line of 
the table also explained that if a play of the machine resulted in no matching symbols, the 
payout would be zero pence. It was emphasised in the instructions that these outcome 
values were exclusive of the five pence stake. Control participants were shown an 
accurate description viewed a payout table with the outcome values 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 
pence and their associated symbol combinations. Participants in the group shown a 
skewed description viewed a payout table with the outcome values 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 
25, and 100 pence and their associated symbol combinations. This skewed table 
suggested an initial belief that overlapped with the control participants‘ but also included 
false higher-value outcomes that would not be observed during the experiment. Despite 
the different payout tables, both groups played the same task and observed random 
draws from the same underlying distribution. 
 
The experiment interface used fruit graphics, which are highly associated with slot 
machines imagery, and animations such as spinning reels and moving levers to simulate 
the appearance of real-world slot machines. The size of the screen display allowed the 
participant to see up to three symbols on each reel depending on the reel position. The 
machines had a single payout line (combinations of symbols must fall on the payout line 
to qualify for winnings) through the middle; symbols above and below (―near misses‖) 
were also viewable but were randomised. When a participant clicked on a machine to 
play it, the reels appeared to spin and then slow to a rest after three seconds, displaying 
the final screen of fruit symbol graphics that matched the outcome received on that trial. 
The final screen and numerical outcome value (e.g., 4 pence) was shown on the screen 
for 1.5 seconds. After this time, the screen returned to the initial state and participants 
could click on the machine they wished to play next. No bank or cumulative total 
information was shown to the participant at any time during the task except after 
completion. 
 
At three times during the experimental task, participants were asked to illustrate their 
beliefs about what outcomes the machines paid out and how likely those outcomes were. 
To do this, participants were asked to articulate their beliefs using pie charts. This 
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method was chosen both for its familiarity for participants and for its convenience for 
eliciting comparable judgments between groups of the size of the outcome space. By 
providing blank response templates, this design requires participants to generate the 
outcome space and associated probabilities without being prompted by the experimenter 
for different outcome values. Alternative methods of elicitation of probabilities requiring 
prompting responses one outcome at a time or listing the full space of outcome values 
for the participant may have had undesirable consequences in defining the outcome 
space for the participant. Although phenomena such as subadditivity cannot be 
investigated in this paradigm, the benefits for the relevant hypotheses being tested are 
greater than this limitation.  
 
To complete the pie charts, participants were given pen and paper with circle outlines, 
which served as blank templates. Each template sheet had one blank circle for the 
machine on the left and another identical one for the machine on the right, each with an 
indicator for the centre of circle to aid in drawing. Many participants readily understood 
this instruction but all watched the experimenter create an example pie chart and had the 
opportunity to ask questions.  
 
Participants 
Fifty-three participants were recruited to participate in paid studies on gambling from the 
University College London Psychology Department Subject Pool, Gumtree (a popular 
online UK notice board), and local newspapers. Data collection was run in two phases 
several months apart but no statistical differences between the collection groups were 
found (all p values > 0.21). One participant was removed from analysis because his 
responses indicated he did not use the pie chart templates correctly and two participants 
were removed from analyses of initial outcome distribution ratings due to the same 
problem; these participants recovered and were able to use the response templates 
correctly for the latter two judgments. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions, 
resulting in a final sample of 27 participants in the accurate payout table group and 26 
participants in the skewed payout table group. 
 
Procedure 
In the first phase of data collection, this experiment was run on its own. In the second 
phase of data collection, this experiment was run in conjunction with three unrelated 
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experimental tasks on gambling. The tasks were administered in the same order for all 
participants; this experiment was run third in the series, following a task for which 
participants wagered on the roll of a die. It is assumed there are no carryover effects 
between experimental tasks. The procedure during the task is identical in both collection 
phases. 
 
At the start of the task and at two times during the task, participants were asked to 
answer questions. Before beginning machine play but after being shown the playing 
environment including the machines and payout tables, participants were asked to give 
their best guess as to the hidden probabilities associated with the outcome distribution. 
After completing a pie chart for the machine on the left of the screen and another for the 
machine on the right, participants then began to play the machines. After 30 trials, the 
program automatically stopped the participants and prompted them to respond to 
questions. The experimenter presented the pen and clean paper and asked the participant 
to again illustrate the different payouts they believed the machines generally paid out, and 
how likely those payouts were. After 80 trials, the prompts were repeated. The timing of 
the prompts after 30 and 80 trials was not known to the participants. The payout tables 
that displayed the outcome space were visible during the first response time before play 
had begun but were not visible during the latter two judgment collections; participants 
completed these pie charts from memory. 
 
After completing the 80 trials, participants responded to a forced choice question about 
the machines‘ outcome-generating processes. Participants were asked which statement 
most closely matched their belief: ―playing required skill to avoid bad luck or bad streaks 
at machines‖ or ―it didn't matter what I did or how I played‖. 
 
Results 
In this experiment, a mixed design compared two groups‘ changing beliefs over time 
about a hidden outcome distribution, measured by probability judgments and responses 
to direct questions after completion of the task. Neither group was compared to the true 
underlying distribution because it was believed that this standard is too high to be 
appropriate; an infinite number of underlying distributions might have produced the 
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sequences observed by the participants5. The experience of the two groups varied only 
on the range of outcomes listed in the payout tables shown during the task; all 
participants experienced slightly different sequences of outcomes due to the random 
outcome-generating process but no significant differences in the final sum of outcomes 
received were found between groups, t(52) = 1.23, ns. 
 
Estimates of mean payout 
Participants in both experimental groups made probability distribution judgments before 
play began, after 30 trials, and after 80 trials. At these collection times, participants were 
asked to report what payouts they thought the machine paid out in general, and how 
likely were those payouts. An example of a participant‘s response in pie chart form is 
shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Example of a participant‘s hand-drawn initial judgment of a machine‘s underlying 
probability distribution of outcomes. This participant indicated that the possible outcome 
space included 0, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 100 pence outcomes and that the most likely 
outcome would be of no matching symbols, or 0 pence. 
 
 
The first analysis of these data shown below in Figure 5 is of the raw mean estimates 
calculated using participants‘ pie charts. By measuring each pie chart segment, the 
researcher was able to assess how likely the participant believed each outcome to be and 
therefore the participant‘s subjective expected value for a play of the slot machine. In the 
example shown in Figure 4, the participant expresses a belief that the probability of an 
outcome of 0 pence is 50% and the subjective expected value of a play of the machine is 
7.74 pence. Analysis of these data find that there are significant differences between the 
                                                 
5 For example, consider the cash register. If its premise and arithmetic were completely unknown, it would be 
impossible to learn arithmetic with certainty about its rules based on only observed outcomes (Oaksford & Chater, 
2007). 
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two experimental groups (F(1, 51) = 29.95, p < 0.001, ŋp
2 = 0.38) and within groups over 
the three judgment times (F(1, 51) = 4.18, p = 0.02, ŋp
2 = 0.08). The interaction of the 
two factors is also significant (F(1, 51) = 4.12, p = 0.02, ŋp
2 = 0.08). These findings 
suggest that participants who were shown skewed payout tables consistently gave higher 
estimates of the expected value of a machine play than control participants but showed a 
trend of converging toward estimates similar to control participants as a function of 
number of trials played. Similarly, control participants refined their estimates over time, 
as shown by the decreasing variance in the measure of mean payout over time. These 
data are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Data from participants‘ pie charts were used to calculate each participant‘s implied 
estimate of mean payout. Data shown in grey bars are from participants who were shown 
skewed payout tables including fictional higher-values of 15, 20, 25, and 100 pence. 
Responses for the left and right machines at each judgment collection time were averaged 
resulting in one response per participant for each of the three judgment times. 
 
 
 
Remembering that each participant observed a different randomly-generated sequence of 
outcomes, the next analysis illustrated in Figure 6 examines each participant‘s pie 
estimates of the mean given their unique observed sequence of outcomes to assess 
whether group differences in estimates are due to differences in observed sequences. 
Their observed values were compared to their reported estimates from collection times 
after 30 and 80 trials to calculate an error measure; initial judgments are not included in 
this analysis because participants did not observe any outcomes before making initial 
judgments. These data confirm the analysis of the raw estimates: there are significant 
differences between the two experimental groups (F(1, 51) = 7.06, p = 0.01, ŋp
2 = 0.12) 
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and within groups over the two judgment times (F(1, 51) = 6.45, p = 0.01, ŋp
2 = 0.11). 
The interaction of the two factors is also significant (F(1, 51) = 6.29, p = 0.02, ŋp
2 = 
0.11).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Each participant‘s mean observed payout for each machine was subtracted from 
each participant‘s implied estimate of mean payout for that machine to calculate errors in 
estimation. Values greater than zero indicate overestimation and values close to zero indicate 
accurate estimation. Errors for both the left and right machines were averaged resulting in 
one error measure per participant per judgment during machine play. 
 
Accuracy of pie estimates 
As shown in Figure 6, control participants who were shown an accurate payout table 
made precise estimates not significantly different from the observed data after 80 trials 
(M = -0.09, SE = 0.13; one-sample t-test against 0: t(26) = 0.67, ns) and after only 30 
trials (M = -0.10, SE = 0.13; one-sample t-test against 0: t(26) = 0.77, ns). This accuracy 
provides support for the validity of this method of subjective probability elicitation to 
capture sensible data.  
 
 
Representation of fictional higher-value outcomes 
Although it is evident that the participants of the two groups perceive the expected value 
of each machine play differently, further analysis of the pie charts may explain where the 
difference emerges from. Estimates of the means alone cannot distinguish 
overestimation of the likelihood of observed outcomes (e.g., believing the 5 or 10 pence 
outcome happen more frequently than the observed data suggest) from categorically 
representing higher-value outcomes with any degree of likelihood (e.g., believing the 100 
pence outcome is possible with a 1% likelihood). The pie charts show that the primary 
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source of the overestimation comes from maintaining a belief in the likelihood of the 
fictional higher-value outcomes. After 30 trials, 61.54% of participants in the skewed 
payout table group continued to maintain the unsupported belief of at least one higher-
value outcome while only 3.70% (one participant) indicated the same in the control 
group (p < 0.001, Fisher‘s exact test). After even 80 trials, the difference in number of 
participants maintaining beliefs in higher-value outcomes remains significant (Skewed: 
30.78%; Controls: 0%; p < 0.01, Fisher‘s exact test). This pattern shows that participants 
converged toward the observed data and no participants developed a skewed belief of 
unsupported fictional higher-value outcomes after having expressed a belief reflecting the 
observed outcome values only. 
 
Beliefs about the nature of the outcome-generating process 
Direct questions probed participants for their beliefs about the nature of the underlying 
outcome-generating process. It was hypothesised that participants who were shown the 
skewed payout table and expected to receive higher-value outcomes may believe that they 
are performing poorly on the task when they do not receive the expected outcomes. 
When asked whether outcomes required luck or skill or were merely random, only 3.70% 
of people (1 person) in the control group indicated that skill in avoiding bad luck was a 
significant factor while 30.78% thought as such from the group who viewed skewed 
payout tables. This analysis suggests that the different payout tables changed the 
participants‘ beliefs about the outcome-generating process. Indeed, the two are highly 
related: a logistic regression predicting belief type finds that those participants who 
categorically represent at least one fictional higher-value outcome are 8.00 times more 
likely to also believe the outcome-generating process is based on luck or skill (B = 2.08, p 
= 0.02). Although these correlations cannot provide directional explanations for 
participant responses, they support the hypothesis that beliefs about an underlying 
outcome distribution and associated underlying outcome-generating process may be 
related. 
 
Discussion 
It was hypothesised that expectations about outcome space would affect processing of 
evidence including the updating of beliefs about the outcome distribution and the nature 
of the outcome-generating process. In other words, despite seeing the same evidence, 
participants who were shown a skewed payout table including fictional higher-value 
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outcomes would persist in estimating the expected value of machine play to be higher 
than controls. This study‘s novel method of eliciting probabilities also enabled 
examination of participant‘s beliefs in probabilistic outcomes for understanding how 
these beliefs change over time. 
 
Participants‘ overall ease of responding with pie charts to articulate probabilistic 
information indicates that decision makers are able to encode and use probabilities. 
Combined with the accuracy of the pie charts, decision makers seem to be capable of 
using probabilistic information successfully in judgments and decisions. Graphical 
models and representations may prove to be important tools for researchers. 
 
As expected, participants‘ initial estimates of expected value of a machine play differed 
significantly: participants in both groups integrated the entire given outcome space into 
their beliefs, and those participants who were shown a payout table with fictional high 
values ultimately had higher estimates. Without any evidence to observe, participants 
used the payout table cues from the environment. Personal prior experience resulted in 
small variations between players in the relative likelihoods of different outcomes but the 
payout table information was consistently used by participants to define the scope of the 
outcome space. 
 
After the presentation of more and more evidence, participants converged toward the 
observed frequencies regardless of initial beliefs. After only 30 trials, the proportion of 
participants representing these values decreased, and after 80 trials, the number of 
participants decreased still more. Although both groups converged toward the observed 
frequencies, the majority of participants who were shown skewed payout tables 
continued to represent these values in their subjective outcome distribution estimates. 
These data suggest that, despite a lack of any supporting evidence for the higher value 
outcomes, many participants continued to represent them in their subjective probability 
distributions. It may be the case that these participants eventually eliminate the higher-
value outcomes but there may be individuals who maintain the beliefs despite even 
hundreds of data observations. A common model of the game that results in this pattern 
of beliefs is the gambler‘s fallacy whereby the absence of an outcome increases its 
likelihood of occurring in the future. As these data show, many participants who never 
observed a high value outcome still expected one in the future. However, the conclusions 
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to be drawn from these findings are limited by the nature of the random outcome-
generating process; because fictional outcomes can never be disconfirmed by observed 
evidence in this paradigm, even a rational decision making agent might maintain such 
beliefs by, for example, weighting the prior belief in the likelihood of observing such 
outcomes relatively heavily compared to the weight attached to any observed outcomes. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 Study 2, the randomness element of chance game outcomes 
means that this problem of under-determination holds true for many popular games that 
are based on randomness. 
Some might argue that these data support the case for including frequency information in 
payout tables and signage to increase punters‘ awareness and decrease their likelihood of 
updating beliefs without confirming evidence (Delfabbro, 2004; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 
1995). But this solution confuses the issue: at the moment, there is no outcome 
probability information on payout tables of any format, frequentist or probabilistic. And 
it is possible that such information would serve to exacerbate the problem. Fully grasping 
the small chances of hitting a jackpot may make the problem of updating a continuous 
hypothesis of the likelihood of winning a jackpot from a random process even more 
difficult. Not winning a jackpot may become what is expected from playing the game and 
less diagnostic of a negative expected value game.   
 
To return to the discussion begun in the previous study of this chapter, the present 
results provide corroborating evidence in favour of a model-based account of decision 
making for gambling. For the paradigm presented here, a decision making agent using 
heuristics might rely on representativeness or similarity to judge how high the payouts 
from a slot machine are. A rational decision making agent might calculate the expected 
value of the observed sequence and integrate these data with his prior beliefs. But neither 
type of reasoning and decision making predicts differences in agent understanding of the 
outcome-generating process. In contrast, understanding and updating beliefs about the 
outcome-generating process are the foundations of the model-based account. If an 
understanding of the outcome distribution is related to an understanding of the 
outcome-generating process, as the data suggest, then the heuristics and rational theories 
that do not account for outcome-generating processes may fall short of explaining 
decision making under uncertainty.  
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Study 5 
A Computational Account of Model-Based Gambling 
 
 
In the preceding studies, we have examined decision making in gambling in increasingly 
finer focus. We began by observing behaviour in the real world, then manipulating 
behaviour in the laboratory, and then eliciting online judgments from participants as they 
completed an experimental task. In the present study, I continue to refine this focus to 
investigate the mechanisms and processes that might drive these behaviours. It is my aim 
with this modelling exercise to demonstrate one possible route for developing a process-
level account of model-based decision making in gambling. 
 
Consider again the slot machine and the decision making agents who play them. What 
this problem and many real-world gambles and decision making tasks under uncertainty 
share in common is inductive inference, or prediction based on the observation of data. 
What will happen next? To make a bet on an event, gamblers typically integrate what is 
known and what has been observed to predict the outcome. Even with games such as 
roulette, in which the outcomes are independent, it is not uncommon to find gamblers 
studying previous outcomes to find patterns that will predict a winner.  
 
But we are concerned with gambles for which the underlying outcome-generating 
processes are hidden. I assume that decision makers naturally and commonly approach 
these gambles as inductive inference tasks and use the tools of hypothesis evaluation to 
gather evidence to examine the hypothesis‘ fit to the data. There is a broad range of 
studies that support this view in other domains of everyday reasoning; for example: 
clinicians and medical diagnoses (Weber, 1993); mechanics and auto failure (Mehle, 
1982); and scientists and research findings (Fischhoff, 1977). To close the chapter on 
decision making under fixed and unknown uncertainty, this study presents a modelling 
exercise that qualitatively explores the cognitive processes underlying hypothesis 
evaluation in gambling. 
  
A model of hypothesis generation and evaluation, HyGene  
As a process account of memory-based judgment and decision making, HyGene (R. P. 
Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008) describes how hypotheses are 
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generated, evaluated, and used for probability judgments in inductive inference tasks 
within the confines of a bounded cognitive system. It is built upon MINERVA-DM 
(Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999), which has been shown to account for many diverse 
judgment and decision making results including frequency judgments, conditional 
likelihood judgments, availability and representativeness heuristics, base-rate neglect, 
conjunction fallacy, the validity effect, and hindsight bias. It is a natural place to begin 
developing a computational account of decision making in gambling.  
 
The original paper describes the model comprehensively and only the relevant details will 
be reproduced here. First I will give a brief overview of HyGene, describe the assumed 
structure of memory in which the model operates, and explain the process of retrieval 
from memory used in hypothesis generation and evaluation. Finally, I will discuss how 
this model relates to the model-based decision making account. 
 
HyGene is a global matching, multiple-trace memory model. The model has three core 
tenets: data from the environment serve as cues for retrieval from long-term memory; 
cognitive and task characteristics limit the number of hypotheses that may be entertained 
at any point in time; and probability judgments are based on comparisons of only those 
hypotheses being considered at the time of judgment.  
 
The structure of memory in HyGene 
Memory comprises ―hypotheses‖, or mental representations of external events. Critically, 
one‘s mental representation of an event is not assumed to be the same as the actual 
event. The collection of possible external events in the world (e.g., the universe of 
possible medical symptoms) is broken into smaller subsets, as illustrated in Figure 7. 
Within this structure, overlapping hypotheses are clustered near each other based on 
their degree of similarity. Only hypotheses that are known or have been experienced by 
the decision maker (e.g., symptoms seen or read about previously) can be represented 
and these are then further broken down to hypotheses that are relevant to the current 
problem (e.g., symptoms presented recently by similar patients or indicated by the 
current patient‘s history). Of the hypotheses known to the decision making agent, only a 
few may enter working memory, the set of leading contenders (SOC), for consideration 
at any given time.  
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The contents of episodic and semantic memory are traces consisting of data, hypotheses, 
and context. These traces are represented as vectors in the computational model, 
enabling a straightforward comparison of similarity between vectors on features. For 
example, context, which refers to any information that might be encoded as peripheral to 
the hypothesis and data, is a feature within a vector and is represented by a value that is 
numerically similar (in varying degrees) to other hypotheses; hypotheses that share the 
same context also share the same feature value.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. A Venn diagram of the semantic structure assumed in HyGene. The largest circle 
represents the entire space of possible outcomes including those ideas unknown to the 
decision maker (elements with ?s). The large grey area represents the decision maker‘s 
knowledge (elements with Hs). The larger circle within the grey area represents the decision 
maker‘s relevant knowledge, as cued by observed data, Dobs. The smaller white area of 
working memory represents the hypotheses currently being considered (R. P. Thomas et al., 
2008, p. 156). 
 
 
Hypothesis generation and evaluation 
To access long-term memory, a probe vector is created. Traces in memory that are 
activated based on their similarity to this probe are then extracted to the SOC as leading 
contender hypotheses, replacing any weaker hypotheses that might already be under 
consideration. This process of probe and extraction to working memory – the generation 
of hypotheses – continues until the decision making agent fails to generate new 
hypotheses on successive attempts. If the evidence in favour of a hypothesis is extremely 
73 
 
strong, the decision maker may generate only the one hypothesis, as no others will 
surpass the necessary threshold. Then, the posterior probabilities of hypotheses are 
evaluated by comparing the hypotheses‘ base rates from episodic memory. Hypothesis-
guided search follows, whereby leading contender hypotheses guide cue selection. 
 
As a starting point for modelling decision making from a model-based approach, 
HyGene shares with model-based decision making many of the same principles. 
 
Mental representations—Both accounts of decision making distinguish between external 
events and the decision making agent‘s internal representations of those events. Through 
subjective interpretation and forgetting, internal representations differ from the observed 
data.  
 
Limitations of the cognitive system—Both accounts acknowledge that the space of 
possible states known to the decision making agent and the number of hypotheses that 
can be simultaneously entertained are limited compared to a rational decision maker due 
to cognitive and task characteristics. 
 
Cascade of errors throughout the process—Both accounts predict that errors in any one 
phase of decision making will have knock-on effects on other phases in the process. For 
example, an error in hypothesis generation is reflected in probability judgments. 
 
There are, however, several critical disagreements in theory between the model-based 
approach and HyGene. These differences can be illustrated using a coin.  
 
Consider a sequence of coin flips. After three coin flips, the sequence runs HTH. After 
seven coin flips, the sequence might run HTHTTTH. And so on, for any length of 
sequence imaginable. Two questions commonly asked about coin flips in a gambling 
context are: what is the likelihood that the coin is fair? And what will the next coin flip 
outcome be? 
 
How should a computational model of decision making in gambling approach this 
problem? We know that coin flips are random and may result in different sequences, 
with fair coins doing so with equal probabilities and biased coins with lower probabilities. 
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Representing each ―external event‖ (or sequence) in memory would likely absorb a 
significant amount of resources with similarity clustering based on arbitrary criteria. 
Would similarity be based on the number of heads in the sequence? The alternation rate?  
But the data from, and consequently the similarities among, random processes are rarely 
diagnostic. When faced with randomness, to study the outcomes is to focus on the 
distractions. The underlying process generating the outcomes is the real prize. Even 
using base rate information from episodic memory may lead the decision making agent 
astray, making biased inferences from small samples. Instead of mental representations 
of external events as described in R. P. Thomas, et al. (2008), model-based decision 
making assumes mental representations include higher-order structural information 
about the underlying outcome-generating process. Rather than represent the sequences 
of 3, 300, and 3,000 coin flip outcomes and the similarities among them, a decision 
maker represents coins with probabilities of landing on heads of 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and so on.  
 
This coin flip example illustrates two key theoretical differences. 
Content of mental representations—In HyGene, mental representations are understood 
to be mental representations of events that have or have not yet been experienced. As 
described in R. P. Thomas, et al. (2008), examples of these representations might be 
symptoms or test results presented to a doctor for diagnosis. Although these 
representations may contain an arbitrary level of detail in the computational model 
including context features, this picture of a mental representation is incomplete. As 
discussed in the introduction of this chapter and in the results of the previous studies 
presented, there is strong evidence indicating that decision makers‘ beliefs about events 
contain higher-order structural information such as the causal processes that led to the 
outcome and this structural information is reflected in how events and hypotheses relate 
to each other.  
 
Similarity mechanism of evaluation—A mechanism of strength of association or 
similarity between and among data and hypotheses falls short of capturing the intuitive 
and rational representations of randomness, which is essential to the study of gambling. 
This follows as a direct consequence of the higher-order structure underlying the internal 
representations of events (as discussed in Chapter 1: Schemas). 
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An experimental paradigm similar to that used in Study 4 of this chapter may provide an 
appropriate test of whether the model-based assumptions are necessary or HyGene‘s 
similarity comparisons are sufficient. In Study 4, analysis found that the two experimental 
groups—those who were given an accurate prior hypothesis about the game and those 
who were given a similar but inaccurate prior hypothesis—maintained different beliefs 
about the underlying outcome distribution and outcome generating process, as the group 
with inaccurate prior knowledge was less likely to respond correctly to judgments 
collected during the experiment. Over time, however, these participants converged 
toward the observed data. Critically, this shows that a decision making agent may at any 
time conclude that the observed outcomes and probability distribution are the true 
underlying outcomes and probability distribution, without any inferences going beyond 
the data.  
 
Whether these same differences in theory and behavioural data are borne out in the 
modelling exercise here may provide some support for whether future computational 
work on model-based decision making will need to account for these differences.  
 
Overview of the study 
This study aims to provide a qualitative exploration of decision making when prior 
knowledge does not match observed data. For ease of interpretation throughout this 
study, I will simplify this manipulation: a group with correct prior knowledge compared 
to a group with incorrect prior knowledge; however, in the model‘s terms, this 
manipulation translates to comparing a group with an accurate and narrowly-defined set 
of hypotheses to a group with a broad diverse set of hypotheses. These findings should 
also apply to the more general problem of mismatch between observed data and 
expectations. The contents of semantic memory and the retrieval probe vector as well as 
experience were manipulated. The data produced are compared to simulations run 
according to the specifications in Simulation 1 of R. P. Thomas, et al. (2008). 
 
Simulation methodology 
To create a manipulation in the model that is qualitatively similar to that used in the 
experimental paradigm of Study 4, the content of memory and the probe vectors used 
for retrieval were modified. Semantic and episodic memory structures are two 
components of memory which are conventionally modelled as associated, with semantic 
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structure building upon episodic traces. In this simulation, the creation of the two was 
split into separate processes and completed in parallel. Both groups of simulation 
participants observe the same data (same episodic content) but have different prior 
distributions of beliefs (different semantic content).  
 
To achieve this, the vectors used as the basis for memory were modified. In HyGene, a 
random vector is created and copied (with degree of similarity as a parameter) to create 
prototypes that serve as the basis of episodic and semantic memory. One of these 
prototype vectors is designated as the focal hypothesis while another is designated as an 
alternative hypothesis; which hypothesis is the ―focal‖ one is simply for the purposes of 
evaluation and probability judgment at a later stage. The traces from these prototypes 
make up episodic memory. Importantly, the modifications in this study did not change 
the content of episodic memory; both groups observed the same data.  
 
For the participants who enter the task with the correct prior knowledge, only variations 
on one hypothesis were considered, rather than many alternative hypotheses. In other 
words, these participants had a narrowly-defined idea about how the game worked and 
entertained only adjustments to that fundamental idea. This does not necessarily assume 
that the strength of the focal hypothesis is particularly strong, only that the set of 
hypotheses considered are all highly similar to each other. This manipulation of a narrow 
structure of semantic memory mimics a confirmation bias in hypothesis testing, whereby 
alternative hypotheses are not considered and incoming evidence is interpreted as 
supporting the focal; this has been shown to be the prevalent strategy in many learning 
and prediction tasks (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 1983; Klayman & Ha, 1989; Nickerson, 
1998). In the model, the content of semantic memory is reduced to only variations on the 
focal hypothesis; see the right panel of Figure 8 for an illustration. This manipulation is 
represented by participants having only one type of hypothesis in mind. With all memory 
traces emerging from the same prototype, the scope of hypotheses in semantic structure 
is more focused.  
 
For those participants who enter the task with incorrect prior knowledge, a broader 
range of alternative hypotheses is considered, which includes, but is not limited to, the 
true focal hypothesis. This is represented in the left panel in Figure 8. This specification 
77 
 
is the original, broader, representation of hypothesis generation depicted in R. P. 
Thomas, et al. (2008) and approximates the manipulation of prior beliefs in Study 4.  
            
Figure 8. The left panel is a reproduction from R. P. Thomas, et al. (2008) showing how 
semantic memory is structured in HyGene. Semantic memory is based on both a focal 
hypothesis and alternative hypotheses. This specification is used in the present modelling 
exercise to approximate a group of participants who enter the task with a broad range of 
hypotheses. The right panel shows a modified version of semantic structure in which there 
are only variations on the focal hypothesis. This specification approximates those 
participants who enter the task with narrow prior knowledge. 
 
 
 
Results and discussion 
Two hypotheses are tested for qualitative comparison to experimental data presented in 
Study 4 of this chapter. The prior knowledge of one group was designed to approximate 
a mismatch with observed data (e.g., misunderstanding the task or having no knowledge 
of the task, using the original specifications from R. P. Thomas, et al. (2008) Simulation 
1) and a second group was designed to match prior knowledge and observed data (e.g., 
having a fine focus on what will be observed in the task). Also, for both groups, 
experience was manipulated to approximate the progress of learning over time. In 
interpreting the results shown, it is helpful to first note that the parameter Sim, which is 
the measure of similarity between the focal hypothesis and alternatives in semantic 
memory, was set relatively low at 0.5; in models that include alternative hypotheses, this 
parameter ensures those hypotheses appear dissimilar to the focal hypothesis. As Sim 
approaches 1.0, the similarity between the focal and alternative prototypes would 
decrease and any differences between the experimental groups would diminish. 
 
Simulation results are shown in Figure 9. The figure plots the probability of choosing the 
correct hypothesis as a function of encoding fidelity across different distributions of base 
rates for the hypotheses in semantic memory. Within each graph are series for data 
simulated with increasing levels of experience. These graphs are divided into two panels, 
which show the results for a focused decision maker with correct prior knowledge (top 
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panel) and the results for a decision maker with incorrect prior knowledge (bottom 
panel). 
 
Match between semantic memory and observed data 
Comparing the profiles of the data series in the top and bottom panels of Figure 9 shows 
a clear difference in the likelihood of choosing the correct hypothesis due to the content 
of semantic memory. In the bottom panel, participants with incorrect prior knowledge 
are highly likely to choose the correct hypothesis. In the top panel, the result varies 
depending on encoding fidelity. Because the participants with incorrect prior knowledge 
have a broader range of dissimilar hypotheses in semantic memory, they may be more 
easily able to identify the true focal hypothesis. Because participants with correct prior 
knowledge have a narrow range of alternative hypotheses in semantic memory that are 
highly similar to the true focal hypothesis, it may be difficult to identify the correct 
hypothesis. 
 
Recall that in Study 4 of this chapter, participants who entered the task with the correct 
prior knowledge did well on judgment tasks in which they were asked to estimate the 
long-run average payments and outcome distributions of the slot machines played, while 
participants who entered the task with incorrect prior knowledge significantly 
overestimated average payments and included false outcomes in estimations of the 
outcome distributions. Qualitatively, these simulation results do not match the empirical 
data collected in experimentation with actual participants. 
 
Experience 
Within each graph are plotted the data from simulations run with varying levels of 
experience. The low experience decision maker has fewer than 20 traces stored in 
episodic memory while the high experience decision maker has approximately 500 traces 
stored. In every condition, there are no gains from experience. In the top right graph of 
Figure 9, the high experience decision maker is less likely to choose the correct 
hypothesis compared to the low experience decision maker. This counterintuitive result 
likely occurs because, when experience is low, the strong focal hypothesis is relatively less 
affected by the encoding loss or forgetting while the weak alternative hypotheses suffer 
greatly with such few episodic traces. 
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Figure 9. Probability of choosing the correct hypothesis as a function of content of prior 
knowledge (top panel A = narrowly-defined semantic structure with high degree of match to 
observed data; bottom panel B = broader semantic structure with mismatch to observed 
data), encoding fidelity (L), expertise (1x, 10x, 30x episodic traces), and relative strength of 
the focal hypothesis (weak focal = 1-6-2-2; uniform focal = 2-2-2-2; strong focal = 10-2-2-2). 
In all simulations, Sim = 0.5 and number of participants = 2000. Bars for standard errors of 
the means are not shown but are all below 0.0067.  
 
 
Again, this is not the result expected based on the data collected in experiments. While 
participants in the experiments converged over time to the observed data, the 
participants in the simulations are unchanging. In HyGene, ―experience‖ is approximated 
by increasing the number of episodic traces in memory. Given the similarity mechanism 
for choosing among hypotheses, increasing the episodic traces in memory serves to 
amplify any effects found. In the case of mismatched priors and data, there may be a 
ceiling effect. In the case of matched priors and data, increased experience serves to push 
the already-similar hypotheses closer together; the true focal hypothesis is harder to 
identify.  
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Encoding fidelity 
Figures shown in the bottom panel B replicate the results depicted in Figure 5 of R. P. 
Thomas, et al. (2008, p. 168), with the probability of choosing the correct hypothesis 
high and unvarying as a function of encoding fidelity. The probability increases slightly 
due to decreased encoding fidelity, or randomised information loss, across all hypotheses, 
which creates differences between the otherwise similar hypotheses (M. R. Dougherty; 
personal communication, October 11, 2010). In other words, the model finds that 
decision makers who enter the task with many alternatives in prior knowledge are highly 
likely to choose the correct hypothesis independent of ability to correctly encode the 
data.  
 
Figures in the top panel A show the data from the modified model in which a narrow 
semantic memory closely matches observed data. Again, the main effect of encoding 
fidelity is present, whereby a low encoding fidelity results in high likelihood of choosing 
the correct hypothesis. However, the simulations show that as encoding fidelity 
approaches 1.0, the hypotheses in semantic memory converge (the hypotheses are all 
variations of the same vector) and the model is less likely to choose the correct 
hypothesis. 
 
The simulation results indicate that HyGene in its present form is not a computational 
account of gambling and model-based decision making and cannot fit the empirical data 
from Study 4. Despite addressing numerous findings in the judgment and decision 
making literature, its theoretical basis in similarity of events restricts its ability to 
represent perceptions of and judgments about randomness. Because similarity is an 
arbitrary measure for assessing randomly-produced outcomes, the basic principles of 
HyGene and other similarity-based models of decision making, are flawed from the 
outset for describing gambling behaviour. This simulation also shows that HyGene does 
not consider learning about underlying outcome-generating processes. The studies 
previously presented in this thesis have shown that individuals use structured 
representations of the outcomes and the outcome-generating processes of the problems 
they face. The model‘s inability to qualitatively predict improvements in judgment due to 
learning highlights the absence of a capacity to evaluate the evidence being observed.  
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There may be cause to expand HyGene‘s notion of a hypothesis to include higher-order 
structural information, whereby clustering in memory is based on not only similarity but 
also meaningful structure. This modification may address both concerns identified in this 
study. Future progress in a psychology-driven computational account of model-based 
decision making may benefit from the advances already made in machine learning. 
Although the premises and goals of the two approaches are different, there are shared 
obstacles. Researchers of adaptive control also study algorithms for sequences of 
decisions under fixed and unknown uncertainty (Burghes & Graham, 1980; Kaelbling et 
al., 1996; Sutton & Barto, 1998). For example, Sutton‘s Dyna architecture (Sutton, 1991) 
builds a model based on data and then adjusts behaviour using both data and the model.  
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Chapter 4 
Dynamic Uncertainty 
 
 
Unfortunately, a coin for illustrating dynamic uncertainty does not exist. If it did, it 
would spontaneously gain and lose additional sides of varying heaviness. Those 
observing the coin flip might not know what outcomes, let alone likelihoods of those 
outcomes, existed, what process would generate those outcomes, or what parameters 
might predict them. In other words, the coin would behave much like people do. 
 
Environments of dynamic uncertainty present problems for agents that may be 
incompletely described or entirely misunderstood. A decision making agent faced with 
such a class of uncertainty has incomplete information about both the underlying 
outcome distribution and the outcome-generating process. Further to this ignorance, the 
distribution and process may change over time and the reasons for such state changes are 
also unknown to the agent. Unlike in the games previously discussed such as dice, an 
agent in dynamic uncertainty does not know what parameters, outcomes, or actions are 
relevant. To make even slight progress, the agent must learn about the processes 
underlying the outcomes—using his prior beliefs, the description of the problem, and the 
incoming evidence.   
 
Building on the discussion of beliefs about future events from Chapter 3 in which beliefs 
about the likelihood of future events were shown to play a role in judgment under 
uncertainty, the present chapter continues under this direction and explores how decision 
making agents use and update beliefs given evidence. In gambling, as in many contexts of 
everyday reasoning, events unfold over time with evidence emerging sequentially and not 
always chronologically. For example, when playing poker, bets are made and cards are 
dealt in sequence around the table and an opponent‘s bet might reveal information about 
cards dealt earlier in the hand. Furthermore, as in the poker example described, the order 
that evidence is revealed may have no meaningful relationship to the underlying 
outcome-generating processes. The sequential nature is especially critical under dynamic 
uncertainty when new evidence may indicate not only adjustments to hypotheses but also 
qualitatively different hypotheses than previously considered. 
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Updating beliefs under uncertainty 
A necessary part of repeated and sequential decision making under uncertainty is taking 
in new evidence and updating beliefs. The process of belief updating begins with prior 
beliefs that are then adjusted conditionally on the observation of new evidence. In other 
words, prior beliefs and expectations are the starting point from which subsequent 
judgments are generated. They may affect how a decision maker goes about updating his 
beliefs.  
 
In rational accounts of belief revision, a decision making agent systematically and fairly 
evaluates new evidence and integrates it with prior beliefs in such a way that considers 
the full set of evidence under consideration. As discussed in Chapter 1, Bayes‘ theorem is 
a general mathematical rule that results in a posterior probability expressing the degree of 
belief about the probability of a hypothesis being true after observing data. The 
fundamental principle underlying this logic is the competition between hypotheses, and 
Bayes‘ theorem favours the hypothesis that is most likely relative to others.  
 
In heuristics accounts of belief revision, the process is described as anchoring and 
adjustment: focusing on a value, which may be irrelevant to the task, and then 
incrementally, intuitively adjusting from that reference point to reach an estimate 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The heuristic has been identified in gambling scenarios to 
the same result as in other domains: adjustments from the initial anchor are insufficient 
(Chapman & E. J. Johnson, 1994; Schkade & E. J. Johnson, 1989). Several processes 
have been proposed to drive or explain this empirical finding. The insufficient 
adjustment may be due to satisficing after reaching a plausible estimate (Epley, Keysar, 
Gilovich, & Van Boven, 2004). Alternatively, decision making agents may seek and 
construct reasons to explain (and perhaps justify) beliefs, rather than using preferences 
and beliefs to inform reasons (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). Indeed, Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) show that people may be unaware of the reasons for their choices and 
decisions at the time of judgment, and subsequently generate explanations when asked. 
In addition, Epley and Gilovich (2001) have shown that the source of the anchoring 
value affects the degree of adjustment. Errors in the choice or estimation of an anchor 
for a judgment may cascade to subsequent judgments even if the initial anchor is later 
discounted. Such a tendency for constructing a cohesive narrative post-hoc suggests that 
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initial biases and errors in prior beliefs may persist in online and global judgments despite 
disconfirming evidence. 
 
In this chapter, I integrate the ideas and results of the previous two chapters to explore 
how the different ways in which agents perceive and reason about problems of 
uncertainty affect decision making and learning. I present data from two new studies. In 
the first study, prior beliefs were experimentally manipulated to test how subjective 
perceptions of the problem (also known as prior beliefs) of different informative values 
are integrated with incoming evidence. In the second study, the diagnosticities of focal 
and peripheral learning cues were manipulated to study how decision making agents learn 
about hidden outcome-generating processes.  
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Study 6 
Revisiting the Endowment Effect from the Starting Gate 
 
 
Although humans are the archetypal examples of problems of dynamic uncertainty, the 
complexity of human behaviour (and the motives and emotions that implicitly 
accompany it) can make research into decision making about people challenging. Horses, 
on the other hand, can be similarly unpredictable but are qualitatively simpler. Horse 
races have been used previously in studies of decision making in gambling, by Metzger 
(1985) which demonstrated the applications of decision making findings in racetrack 
betting markets, finding that individuals‘ behaviour aligned with the predictions of the 
gambler‘s fallacy, risk preferences changing as a function of reference points, and the 
illusion of validity that had been found previously in the laboratory. 
 
Before the race begins, gamblers must integrate their prior beliefs to converge on an 
initial wager without any evidence from the present race. There exists a large volume of 
data—about the horses, the jockeys, the pitch, the weather and more—of high and low 
predictive validity available before a given race, but there is no clear formula for 
integrating these data into a meaningful judgment6. How does a punter wade through 
these data, choosing which to weigh heavily and which to discard? Ceci and Liker (1986) 
found that even non-expert racetrack gamblers used complex multivariate models to 
predict winners and post-time odds. Furthermore, these initial beliefs may have durable 
effects on the processing of subsequent incoming evidence. Believing the track and 
running conditions to be poor may influence judgments of a losing horse‘s true ability. 
Prior beliefs are critical in the development of judgments over time. 
 
The endowment effect 
One of the most robust and widely-reported anomalies in economics is a pattern of 
preferences called the endowment effect, whereby people require more to give up an 
object than they will pay to acquire it (Thaler, 1980). In other words, being given an 
object to own or merely touch changes the way in which people subsequently value it. 
                                                 
6 This has been done successfully by modelling large volumes of historical data but, unlike the guaranteed-
win systems of roulette, this model is not for sale (personal communication, J. E. V. Johnson, November 6, 
2008). Interestingly, there is also a real possibility that no amount of data will predict a result; e.g., if a horse 
race is fixed, as in India (personal communication, S. Puri, May 7, 2010). 
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Being endowed with an object is not unlike the common experience of being endowed 
with a belief – such belief endowments occur in the real world implicitly through 
advertising and explicitly through advice, for example. The endowment effect has been 
identified in chimpanzees (Brosnan et al., 2007) and in humans for markets ranging from 
chocolate bars (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990) to lottery tickets (Bar-Hillel & 
Neter, 1996). People are reluctant to exchange a lottery ticket for more than its expected 
value if it is endowed. Will gamblers inflate the value of endowed beliefs in the same 
way? 
 
Other demonstrations of such trades have found that we do not always find value in 
endowments when there is none. Brookshire and Coursey (1987), in searching for 
evidence of learning, find that over repeated market experiences the endowment effect 
diminishes and participants‘ valuations for willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay 
for environmental goods begin to converge. Gamblers may be able to learn from 
evidence to overcome initial endowed beliefs. However, some gambles cannot be 
repeated. Rational individuals must learn both across markets and within a single market. 
 
The impact of evidence source credibility on prior beliefs 
The source of a belief or item of evidence should be considered when evaluating it. At 
the racetrack, a tip from a business partner would take precedence over an unsolicited tip 
from a stranger. However, there are several examples of decision makers using source 
information to their disadvantage. Schum (1981; Schum & Martin, 1982) found that, 
when asked to integrate vast quantities of disparate data, people may inadvertently use 
disconfirming and nondiagnostic evidence as corroborating evidence, due to 
considerations of source. For example, advice from an expert, which might appear 
relevant, may be accepted despite its true irrelevance to the wager at hand (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973; Metzger, 1985). Harman (1986) suggests that revisions to prior beliefs 
may rely on several principles, including coherence with other prior beliefs and, similarly, 
an interest in not being inconsistent. When experts and typically appropriate sources 
offer information, decision makers happily integrate the information while maintaining 
consistent and coherent explanations for their beliefs.  
 
Although such information from experts or less credible sources may influence initial 
wagers, it would be expected that subsequent wagers for which the decision maker 
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himself can evaluate incoming evidence would dominate any so-called advice. 
Consistency and accuracy of beliefs are critical for gamblers, but profit is the ultimate 
criterion.  
 
Overview of experiment 
This experiment uses horse race wagering to explore endowed beliefs and the impact of 
belief source on belief updating over time. Participants‘ prior beliefs were experimentally 
manipulated in the following ways. First, rather than be given tangible and salient 
endowments, participants were endowed with beliefs but no ownership and, in some 
cases, no physical evidence of endowment. Second, the type of belief endowed was 
manipulated between subjects: one group received a valuable tip and another a 
meaningless instruction as to which horse the participant ―likes to win‖. And third, 
participants were probed multiple times for online judgments within single markets. 
Unlike previous experiments that collected only one-off judgments or a series of one-off 
judgments from repeated markets, this dataset includes beliefs updated upon evidence 
and feedback. As in traditional endowment experiments, participants were offered the 
same wagering choices with no costs for switching or trading of items. No horses were 
owned and responses as wagers clearly represented choices of money and reward rather 
than the endowed items. 
 
It was predicted that the manipulations of source of belief and judgments over time 
would divide the rational normative and heuristic theories from the model-based account 
of decision making. First, as has been found in previous studies, the value of the source 
of belief was predicted to have no effect on wagering, in contrast to the normative 
theory. Whether participants were shown a valuable tip or a valueless prompt to like a 
horse, they would show a bias in favour of the horse. Second, the biases in initial beliefs 
were predicted to endure to subsequent judgments collected online during the task, 
despite observing evidence disconfirming endowed beliefs, in contrast to the heuristic 
account. Such a result again would indicate that a structured approach to understanding 
decision making is necessary. 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Method 
Design and materials 
The study comprised two races. The first race used a between-groups manipulation of 
source of prior beliefs: one group of participants was instructed that they ―liked a horse 
to win‖ but were not provided with any evidence or reason to favour that horse, a 
second group was given advice from a local track ―tipster‖ that a horse would win; both 
groups were compared to a control group of participants who received no special 
instructions. Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition and 
remained unaware of any alternative task specifications. A second race served to replicate 
the first with a separate independent horse race under the same instructions and assess 
the transfer of learning from feedback. 
 
All participants completed the same task, including wagering on the same horses (the 
first and second place finishers of each race; place information was withheld from the 
participants during the race), and received the same instructions except regarding the 
specific manipulation of endowment. Participants in the control group read: ―You will be 
assigned to two of these top [the field was narrowed to those horses finishing in the top 
four] horses. While you‘re watching the race, we‘ll ask you to stake money on these two 
horses.‖ Participants in the ―like‖-endowment group read: ―You will be assigned one of 
these horses. Then, we‘ll match your horse against another of these top horses. While 
you‘re watching the race, we‘ll ask you to stake money on these two horses‖ and saw a 
script reading ―You like Happy Daze [2nd place horse] to win‖ before the race began and 
a ―Your Horse‖ identifier at wagering prompts. No reasons were given for why the 
participant should favour the horse. In contrast, participants in the ―tip‖-endowment 
group were shown the same instructions as those in the control group, and shown a pop-
up window containing the advice: ―The tipster at the track has said Happy Daze [2nd 
place horse] looked eager just before going into the gate.‖ Participants in both 
experimental groups were endowed with the same second-place finishing horse and 
observed the same early disconfirming evidence. Participants were free to stake any 
wager amount on either horse at all wagering prompts. Participants‘ payments were based 
on the outcomes of a random selection of these bets, incentivising participants on each 
trial to back the horse they believed would ultimately win. 
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Race footage was taken from the Lagoon Games complete horse racing night game 
package, which included video of ten genuine horse races. For this experiment, the first 
race (the Lagoon Handicap Hurdle; two miles and one furlong) and third race (Lagoon 
Classic; 7 furlongs) were shown. The races comprised new horses about which the 
participants had no performance history or odds information. Audio commentary was 
muted.  
 
Participants 
Forty participants were recruited to participate in a paid study on gambling from the 
University College London Psychology Department Subject Pool, Gumtree (a popular 
online UK notice board), and local newspapers. One participant‘s data are omitted from 
analysis due to computer error at time of data collection. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions, resulting in a final sample of 13 participants in each of the control 
group, ―like‖-endowed group, and ―tip‖-endowed group.  
 
Inventories were administered after the task to measure numeracy and gambling problem 
severity (see Appendices 1 and 2). This sample of participants scored 85.80% (SE = 
3.31%) on the numeracy scale, where 100.00% reflects a perfect score and scored 3.46 
(SE = 0.67) on the gambling problem severity scale, where scores above 2.00 indicate 
possible problems with gambling. 
 
Procedure 
This experiment was run in conjunction with three unrelated experimental tasks on 
gambling. The tasks were administered in the same order for all participants; this 
experiment was run first in the series. It is assumed there are no effects of the other 
experimental tasks. 
 
At the start of the task, participants were seated at a computer with instructions for the 
task according to the randomly assigned condition. Participants were instructed they 
would be viewing horse races that had happened in the past and wagering on which 
horse would win. Wagers would be prompted before the race began and at several points 
during the race when the video would be paused; each wager would be new and 
independent of other wagers. Participants were further instructed that each wager was 
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equally important because payment would be calculated using a random selection of all 
wagers. 
 
The endowment manipulation occurred before the first wager of the race. Participants in 
the ―like‖ group viewed a screen with the horse names and jockey colours and read that 
they liked a particular horse to win. Participants in the control group viewed the same 
screen without the additional script. Participants in the ―tip‖ group viewed the same 
screen as control group participants and also a pop-up window with the tipster‘s advice. 
The prompt for wagers showed the two relevant horses‘ names and sliding response bars 
ranging from £0 to £10 virtual money; participants were instructed to place £5 on each 
horse if they thought each was as likely to win as the other or more or all of the £10 on 
the horse they thought was more likely to win. The responses were linked such that if the 
participant indicated a wager on one horse (e.g., £8 in favour of the horse), the wager for 
the other horse would immediately register as the remainder of the £10 (£2 in favour of 
the horse). When the participant submitted his wager, the response bars were cleared and 
wager response history was not shown at subsequent wager prompts. During each wager 
prompt, the paused video remained on screen and the current positions of the horses 
were listed.  
 
Wagers made before the start of the race probed the participant for his a priori 
preference for which horse would win, without data from the horses‘ performance 
during the race. Wagers were collected at five additional points during the race, resulting 
in a dataset that reflected each participant‘s repeatedly updated beliefs about the horses.  
 
Results 
To test the effect of endowment on wagering, a between-subjects design compared the 
wagering biases of three groups which differed only on the source of their prior beliefs. 
The repeated wagers design enables an examination of the duration of the endowment 
effect over time. The second race serves as a replication and tests the durability of any 
effects for carrying over to a second race after feedback on the first race. Although both 
Race 1 and Race 2 use similar experimental designs, the dynamics of the horse race 
stimuli differ between races; this is reflected in the differences in the overall betting 
profiles between races. Consequently, analysis of participant wagers is shown below in 
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two separate sections. Data from the ―tip‖ group is excluded from analysis in Race 2 due 
to the tips being spoilt, from the participants‘ perspective, after the loss in Race 1. 
 
In initial piloting experiments, a small yet significant screen position bias was found; the 
horse for whom the response bar was positioned on the left of the participant‘s screen 
garnered higher wagers. Screen position was randomised and recorded in this 
experiment, and controlled for in each of the following analyses. 
 
Race 1 
Initial wagers—In a regression analysis predicting initial wagers, ―like‖ participants 
wagered more than control participants (M = £6.42, beta = 0.30, p = .08; controls: M = 
£5.23) and ―tip‖ participants wagered significantly more than control participants (M = 
£6.57, beta = 0.38, p = 0.02). In the same model, numeracy was also a significant 
predictor (Beta = -0.37, p = 0.02); in other words, participants with higher numeracy 
scores wagered less.  
 
 
Figure 10. Mean participant wagers (and standard error bars) for the second place finishing 
horse, also the endowed horse in the two endowment conditions ―Tipped‖ and ―Like‖, are 
shown. Data at the first time point represent beliefs before the start of the race. 
 
 
Wagers over time—A mixed ANOVA, considering experimental condition, screen 
position, and numeracy score, confirms that there are differences between groups over 
time F(2,32) = 4.57, p = 0.02, but no significant interaction between time and 
experimental condition; in other words, an endowment before the race does not alter 
how beliefs are updated over time (F(7.63,115) = 0.91, ns). These data are shown in 
Figure 10. 
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To test whether the endowment effect is merely an initial heuristic overcome with the 
presentation of data or an enduring bias despite the presentation of data, the mean wager 
difference between groups was tested for time periods after the race had begun. The 
difference between groups remains significant even after the race began (F(4, 34) = 4.99, 
p < 0.01). Both endowment group participants‘ wagers were inflated compared to 
control participants‘ wagers at the second time period (―like‖: Beta = 0.52, p < 0.01; 
―tip‖: Beta = 0.44, p < 0.01) suggesting that the endowment effect endured despite 
observing the same evidence as controls regardless of the source of the prior belief. 
However, only ―like‖-endowed participants‘ wagers continued to be larger than controls‘ 
in the following time period (third time period: beta = 0.54, p < 0.01). 
 
Tie-breaks—Wagers were prompted at one point in time during the race when the two 
horses were tied in the same position. This tie point occurs at the second wager after the 
race had begun (third time period in Figure 10). At this point in the race, the ―like‖ group 
still wagers significantly more money in favour of the endowed horse compared to 
controls (Beta = 0.54, p < 0.01) while the ―tip‖ group wagers no differently from control 
participants.  
 
Figure 11. Mean participants‘ wagers (and standard error bars) on the second place finishing 
horse in Race 2 are shown.  
 
 
Race 2 
Initial wagers—In a regression analysis predicting initial wagers, ―like‖ participants 
wagered significantly more than control participants (M = £5.92, beta = 0.44, p = .03; 
controls: M = £4.23). In the same model, numeracy was not a significant predictor.  
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Wagers over time—As in Race 1, a mixed ANOVA considering experimental condition, 
screen position, and numeracy score confirms that there are differences between groups 
over time (F(1,9) = 3.86, p = 0.08), but no significant interaction between time and 
experimental condition (F(5,45) = 1.35, ns). These data are shown in Figure 11. 
 
Discussion 
The analyses suggest that a subtle belief endowment may have real consequences. Initial 
wagers, which were probed for before the start of the races as is done in real-world 
betting markets, show significant differences between groups. As expected, participants 
who received tips showed an upward bias in initial wagers in favour of the tipped horse. 
More interestingly, participants who received an instruction to ―like‖ a horse to win also 
showed an upward bias of a similar magnitude, despite the lack of apparent value in the 
instruction. This finding endured despite feedback to the true worthless nature of the 
endowment and persisted in Race 2. Experimentally-induced prior beliefs with no 
information value had an enduring impact on subsequent beliefs despite the presentation 
of new valuable data, and this behaviour looked no different from experimentally-
induced prior beliefs with high information value. 
 
Although such initial behaviour may be considered irrational by many theories of 
decision making, the groups‘ behaviours while observing evidence provide an even more 
rigorous test of the impact of endowments. Once the race has begun, participants 
observe meaningful evidence about the horses‘ likelihoods of winning. For those 
participants receiving a tip, the first wager made after the presentation of evidence may 
reasonably reflect both their endowed belief and the observed evidence; however, for 
those participants instructed to ―like‖ a horse, normative theories of decision making 
find that to continue to consider such a prior belief in a subsequent wagering decision is 
irrational. Empirically, an empty ―like‖ endowment is being utilised as if it had value even 
when integrated with observed evidence. The source of a prior belief—an expert, a 
previous experience, or perhaps even an advertisement—may not be considered in the 
updating process. Such a result may support coherence-based updating whereby the 
individual seeks to maintain a coherent set of beliefs despite any contrary evidence 
(Harman, 1986; Simon & Holyoak, 2002). 
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Wagers made during the race indicate that these biases may diminish with the 
accumulation of evidence as if the initial beliefs continued to be evaluated. All participant 
groups in both races updated beliefs based on the incoming evidence in a similar way, 
showing no significant differences over time. The three groups‘ wagers converge. 
Although the content and value of the belief endowments varied, the evidence suggests 
that the participants did not interpret evidence differently based on the endowed beliefs. 
The tie-break data in Race 1, however, provide a straightforward test of whether prior 
beliefs may still have a residual value: when both horses are tied, only participants who 
like the horse still show a significant bias compared to controls observing the same 
evidence. It may be that, while a belief based on an explicit reason may be dismissed, a 
―like‖ feeling is not as easily shaken.  
 
A separate but still relevant issue to this discussion is introduced by the numeracy factor. 
The numeracy score‘s significant effect on predicting wagers suggests that either the less 
numerate use wagering to express preferences rather than maximise reward or that they 
are more susceptible to manipulations of beliefs. 
 
Prior beliefs are hypothesised to have significant influence on our learning and decision 
making but precisely how they influence our decisions is poorly understood. Many 
rational accounts of learning, such as Bayesian updating, assume that decision makers 
evaluate their priors and weight them against the evidence in a deliberate manner. 
However, underlying this supposition about updating is an additional assumption about 
how prior beliefs are evaluated. This experiment shows that priors may not always be 
assessed; the weight assigned to a prior in learning may be determined by a factor such as 
attention rather than information value. If individuals do eventually overcome an initial 
judgment bias, the improvement may be narrow and unrelated to general learning or 
expertise.  
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Study 7 
Playing the Hand You‘ve Been Dealt 
 
 
The game of poker is one of incomplete information and dynamic uncertainty. In 
addition to the randomisation of the cards as seen in previous games discussed in this 
thesis, there are the added elements of uncertainty from the incomplete information of 
opponents‘ cards and the unknown and changing strategic play. Indeed, it is one of only 
a few types of gambles that involve skill7. Scientists of artificial intelligence have studied 
the game for optimal strategies but have yet to devise a machine that can play as well as a 
human even in simplified versions of poker (Baker & Cowling, 2007; L. Barone & While, 
1999; Billings et al., 2003; Schlicht et al., 2010).  
 
A decision maker playing poker studies his opponents‘ background and behaviours for 
cues to decipher true abilities and likely strategies but this process, as with racetrack 
betting, involves filtering through large volumes of data of different sources and 
diagnosticities. In a previous study on decision and inference in poker, Lopes (1976) 
shows that the likelihood that a hand will win and the amount wagered on that bet is a 
multiplicative function of the subjective likelihoods of beating each individual opponent‘s 
hand. However, her experimental design removed the sequential nature of evidence 
presentation and play and isolated the cards from any conceptualisations about the 
players beyond simple labels like ―conservative‖. It is still unknown how gamblers 
integrate their own prior beliefs with evidence in wagering over time. 
 
Biased evaluations of the diagnosticity of evidence 
As individuals take in new evidence over time, whether through passive observation or 
active search, they engage in belief updating. A gambler‘s beliefs about the game, 
including his own likelihood of winning, is constantly revised as he observes his 
opponents receiving cards, making bets, or even simply looking around the table at 
opponents‘ faces (Schlicht et al., 2010). However, these signals are noisy and challenging 
to interpret given the prevalence of bluffing and strategic play.  
                                                 
7 Whether Texas Hold‘em poker is a skilled game is currently under legal debate. Analysis of 103 million 
hands played on the online poker site PokerStars found that 75.7% of hands ended before showdown. Of 
those hands that did go to showdown, 87.3% of hands that won were inferior to opponents‘. These data 
suggest the use of skill in playing poker (Hope & McCulloch, 2009). 
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The ambiguous evidence gleaned from observing play is highly vulnerable to influence 
from prior beliefs. Hallmarks of the confirmation bias may be found as early in 
hypothesis testing as information search (Klayman & Ha, 1989; Wason, 1960). As a 
consequence, evidence that lowers the likelihood of the focal hypothesis being true or 
even disconfirms it may not be considered (Klayman & Ha, 1987). Evidence for 
alternative hypotheses may be equally or more compelling but again may not be 
adequately considered (Mehle, Gettys, Manning, Baca, & Fisher, 1981; Tversky & D. J. 
Koehler, 1994). Particularly in social scenarios, the motivation to maintain beliefs may 
serve to discount or misinterpret ambiguous evidence (Gilovich, 1983; Higgins, Rholes, 
& C. R. Jones, 1977). Consider the experiment by Darley and Gross (1983): participants 
observed the same video of a child taking an academic test and were asked to judge the 
child‘s academic abilities. One group of participants received no information before the 
viewing, another group was told the child had a high socioeconomic background, and a 
third group was told the child had a low socioeconomic background. While the control 
group assessed the child as performing at approximately grade-level, the other groups 
gave strikingly different responses. Those who were told the child had a high 
socioeconomic background judged the child to have performed well and those who were 
told the child had a low socioeconomic background judged the child to have performed 
poorly. Moreover, both groups used the same evidence to support their judgments. Prior 
beliefs and stereotypes may influence the processing of ambiguous evidence when 
assessing a person‘s abilities. 
 
Despite the plethora of evidence illustrating inaccurate information search strategies and 
conclusions as consequences of confirmation tendencies as summarised here and in 
Chapter 3, the bias itself may not always be misguided. When relevant hypotheses are 
used to guide information search, the decision making process can be greatly accelerated 
and improved as the appropriate sample space is identified and explored more quickly 
and thoroughly. With the aid of confirmation tendencies, decision makers may efficiently 
converge on a likely, well-corroborated hypothesis and then try to falsify it (Mynatt, 
Doherty, & Tweney, 1978). In studies of poker, stereotypes of common strategies have 
been used effectively to improve the learning time of poker playing bots, a finding that is 
likely to also be descriptive of human decision making in poker (Layton, Vamplew, & 
Turville, 2008).  
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Order effects in the presentation of evidence 
The likelihood of obtaining a likely, well-corroborated hypothesis may actually be an 
artefact of superficial constraints such as the order in which evidence is presented. Due 
to the intrinsically sequential nature of information processing, evidence presented early 
in the sequence may be used when processing evidence presented late in the sequence 
but evidence presented late in the sequence may dominate judgments that are made soon 
after the sequence (Anderson, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). In a comprehensive review 
of order effects in belief updating, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) discuss order-effect 
phenomena in the context of their belief-adjustment model. It was found that the 
specific order-effect experienced in different scenarios is dependent on the type and 
timing of response elicited and whether information is processed online or globally. 
 
Particularly relevant to this thesis, there is some indication that beliefs under uncertainty 
are affected by the primacy effect, whereby the decision making agent initially develops a 
belief that is then adjusted conditional on subsequent evidence. For example, Peterson 
and DuCharme (1967) asked participants to sample chips in a sequence and estimate the 
likelihood the chips sampled came from one of two urns with different colour 
distributions. The sequence was manipulated in the experiment such that the first one-
third of trials favoured one urn, the second-third of trials the other, and the final trials 
were neutral. The researchers found that participants tended to favour whichever urn was 
indicated by the first sampling of observations and this belief was not discounted by 
subsequent evidence. 
 
Of note, however, is the contrast between the model-based account of decision making 
described above and a rational normative account. In the task used in this study, 
participants are asked to complete a judgment task that requires online updating for 
wagering as well as global updating for learning from cues about latent factors that 
conflict with their prior beliefs.   A model-based account of learning would predict that 
the order of presentation may affect the direction of attention and the generation of 
alternative hypotheses. An agent faced first with evidence that disconfirms his 
expectations may quickly turn his focus to generating alternative hypotheses while an 
agent faced first with evidence that supports his expectations may block attention to 
peripheral learning cues. The different presentation orders may result in different levels 
of learning from the cues in the environment. In contrast, it is predicted that the 
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Bayesian agent‘s learning and decision making would be unaffected by manipulations of 
order of evidence because of his ability to retrospectively assess data globally and update 
a distribution of priors.  
 
A third theory makes still different predictions: recency effects, whereby the learner 
evaluates only evidence presented recently and therefore only indirectly integrates his 
initial beliefs in decisions, also predicts sensitivity to order of presentation. However, the 
pattern predicted for this method of learning is distinct from a model-based account 
because the sensitivities to incoming evidence will be in the opposite direction: while the 
model-based account predicts that those participants will favour initial evidence, the 
recency account predicts that those participants will favour later evidence.  
 
Overview of experiment 
This study manipulates the expected diagnosticity of cues in the environment and the 
presentation order of evidence in a game of poker. Participants watched eight hands of 
poker played between two computer players and were asked to learn which of two 
players was better, using information in the environment and from players‘ actions, while 
also wagering on the outcomes of hands. The design required the diagnostic validity of 
poker player characteristics to be manipulated for each individual participant on the basis 
of their subjective prior beliefs reported at the start of the task; the cues that participants 
initially believed were important were designed to be nonsignificant, while the cues that 
participants initially believed were nonsignificant were in reality predictive. This 
diagnostic validity manipulation was expected to influence how participants wagered. 
Additionally, the presentation order of evidence was hypothesised to affect learning of 
the true diagnosticity values of the cues.  
 
Method 
Design and materials 
This experiment tests two hypotheses about learning and decision making over time. It 
was predicted that learning, as assessed by changes in cue ratings, would vary based on 
the order of evidence presented such that the adjustments to initial ratings by participants 
who saw evidence disconfirming their incorrect initial beliefs earliest would be larger 
compared to those who saw the same evidence later. It was also predicted that the 
differences in presentation order would result in different patterns of wagering, whereby 
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participants who first received evidence disconfirming their incorrect initial beliefs would 
more quickly converge to optimal wagers in favour of the truly better player than 
participants who received the same evidence later. 
 
Designing the diagnosticity of cues based on prior beliefs—By collecting and using 
subjective prior beliefs to design each individual‘s stimuli, all participants experienced a 
similar task regardless of their knowledge about and experience with poker. To elicit 
subjective prior beliefs about poker players, ratings of the importance of different cues 
were collected.  
 
Profile items included a range of characteristics (e.g., number of years experience playing 
poker, number of languages spoken, favourite number). At the start of the task and again 
at the end of the task, participants were asked to rate the nine characteristics on how 
likely the better player of the two being observed in the task would be to have that 
characteristic. Ratings questions probed for magnitude of importance and the direction 
of the relationship; for example, participants were instructed to move the response bar to 
the right if the better player was likely to have the characteristic and further to the right if 
the player was more likely to have that characteristic. A response in the middle of the 
scale indicated the participant thought the characteristic was irrelevant to poker player 
quality. When rating items at the start of the task, response bars began in a default 
position in the middle but when re-rating items at the end of the task, response bars were 
shown in the positions left by the participant in the earlier response stage. 
 
The logic used to create player profiles is illustrated in Table 2. The profiles of the poker 
players were limited to five items, or cues. Of the five characteristics displayed, two were 
items that had been ranked as highly predictive by the participant (ranked second and 
third out of nine in absolute magnitude of importance) and designed to match the 
participant‘s expectations of a high quality player. For example, if a participant indicated 
that playing professionally was highly likely to be associated with the better player, one 
poker player would be explicitly labelled as ―professional‖ in his profile while the 
opponent labelled as ―amateur‖. A third displayed characteristic had been ranked of 
medium importance by the participant (ranked fifth out of nine) and was designed to 
favour the inferior player; the ―professional‖ player looked relatively worse on this item. 
The fourth and fifth characteristics displayed were the fourth ranked item (designed such 
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that the two players were equally matched) and the eighth ranked item (designed in 
favour of the ―professional‖ player). Ultimately, one poker player excelled on dimensions 
that the participant indicated as being highly predictive of a good poker player while the 
other poker player looked relatively poor and only scored highly on one dimension, 
which was of medium importance.  
 
However, actual performance during the eight hands played in the task clearly favoured 
the player that the participant expected to be worse. The ―better‖ player made severe 
mistakes representative of a poor player. Therefore, only one cue, which had been rated 
of medium importance (Cue D), effectively predicted overall player quality. 
 
 
Table 2. Cues were displayed for the poker players‘ profiles based on each participant‘s initial 
ratings of prior beliefs. Player profiles were created on an individual basis to match each 
participant‘s subjective expectations of high and low quality players, thus ensuring that each 
participant experienced a similar task. A + indicates that the player is superior on that 
dimension, a – indicates inferiority, and an = indicates the players are equally matched.  
 
 
Initial  
Item Rank 
Profile 
Items 
“Better” Player 
Profile  
“Worse” Player 
Profile  
1
st
    
2
nd
 Cue A + - 
3
rd
 Cue B + - 
4
th
 Cue C = = 
5
th
 Cue D - + 
6
th
    
7
th
    
8
th
 Cue E + - 
9
th
    
 
 
 
Manipulating presentation order of evidence—The stimuli presented were designed to 
either confirm or disconfirm the participant‘s initial belief about which player was better. 
Evidence that strongly disconfirms the participant‘s initial beliefs shows one player, the 
player that the participant initially favoured, make severe mistakes. Four hands showed 
consistent disconfirming evidence. For example, the player folds despite having a strong 
hand. The other four hands provide evidence that weakly supports the participant‘s initial 
beliefs: the initially favoured player performs at an adequate level, providing no strong 
positive or negative evidence. During all eight hands, the other player, expected to be 
inferior, plays adequately and on balance performs at a higher level. For example, one 
player bets after cards that are favourable for him come out on the flop and the other 
player folds on what seems like a weaker hand; both players perform adequately in a 
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straightforward hand that does not provide strong positive or negative evidence about 
the quality of either player. Participants in one experimental group observe first the block 
of evidence that disconfirms their initial beliefs and then second the block of evidence 
that supports their initial beliefs, while the second experimental group observed the two 
blocks of four hands in the reverse order. It was emphasised in the task instructions that 
the hands were not shown in the order that they had occurred so that participants would 
not infer causality or expect carryover effects between hands. An ideal agent in this 
paradigm would evaluate each hand independently. 
 
Before each hand, participants were asked to make wagers on which of the two players 
would win the next hand. Participants allocated £10 virtual money to the two players; 
participants were instructed to place £5 on each player if they thought each was as likely 
to win as the other or more or all of the £10 on the player they thought was more likely 
to win. After wagering, each hand was played out.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition and remained unaware 
of any alternative task specifications. In each condition, participants were informed that 
their compensation would depend on the outcomes of the decisions and choices they 
made in the task. All participants read the same instructions regardless of experimental 
condition. 
 
Participants 
Thirty-nine subjects were recruited to participate in a paid study on gambling from the 
University College London Psychology Department Subject Pool, Gumtree (a popular 
online UK notice board), and local newspapers. Participants were randomly assigned to 
conditions. Several participants (15% of the sample) were removed because their 
response pattern suggested a misunderstanding of the response scale, resulting in a final 
sample of 19 participants in the group observing disconfirming evidence first and 14 
participants in the group observing the evidence in the reverse order. In self-reported 
ratings of poker knowledge and experience, the sample responded with a mean 2.31 (SE 
= 0.53) out of 10 rating for poker knowledge and mean 2.75 out of 10 (SE = 0.63) for 
poker experience.  
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Procedure 
This experiment was run in conjunction with three unrelated experimental tasks on 
gambling. The tasks were administered in the same order for all participants; this 
experiment was run fourth in the series. It is assumed there are no effects of the other 
experimental tasks. 
 
At the start of the task, participants were seated at a computer with instructions for the 
task. Participants were instructed they would be viewing, but not playing, a selection of 
eight hands played by two players in a no-limit Texas Hold‘em online tournament that 
had occurred in the past. Participants would have complete access to the players‘ cards 
and bets but not the players‘ strategies, intentions, or quality information except for a 
brief profile. 
 
The instructions also included a brief tutorial on the basic rules and strategies of no-limit 
Texas Hold‘em. Participants were advised that both the dealt cards and also how the 
poker players bet against each other were important in winning a hand; taking advantage 
of opportunities to bluff (bet a large amount on a weaker hand to encourage the 
opponent to fold) and value-bet (bet a small amount on a stronger hand to encourage the 
opponent to call) may be indicators of the quality of a player and the likelihood that he 
will win a hand. Due to the brevity of the tutorial and the anticipated variance in prior 
poker knowledge, summaries were shown after each hand that concisely described how 
each poker player had played in that hand. 
 
After reading the instructions, participants first rated profile items to report their prior 
beliefs about what characteristics they associated with good poker players. Unbeknownst 
to the participants, this rating information was then used to design the remainder of the 
task. Immediately after rating profile information, participants were shown the profiles of 
the two fictitious players and prompted to wager on which player would win the next 
hand, and then the hand was played out. This wagering procedure was repeated for eight 
hands, with the profiles displayed at each wagering prompt. When the eight hands were 
finished, participants were prompted to re-rate the profile information. 
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Results 
In this experiment, a between-groups design tested the effect of order of presentation of 
evidence on how participants learned about the diagnosticity of cues and made decisions 
in a dynamic environment of uncertainty. Participants made two types of judgments: 
profile item ratings and wagers. It was predicted that participants who first observed 
evidence that disconfirmed initial beliefs would attend to peripherally diagnostic cues 
earlier, resulting in superior learning and optimal wagering compared to participants who 
observed evidence in the reverse order.   
 
Pre-task ratings of cue importance 
Ratings elicited at the start of the task represent participants‘ prior beliefs about poker 
players. Participants were asked to rate nine items of information on how likely the better 
player of the two being observed would be to have or represent the characteristic 
described. Mean ratings, shown in the second column of Table 3, suggest that the 
participants had a basic understanding of characteristics associated with poker player 
quality. As expected, ratings between experimental groups were not significantly different 
(all p values > 0.06, except the ninth cue, p = 0.005, though this is still greater than the 
multiple-tests adjusted threshold). Group differences between those with some degree of 
poker knowledge (self-rated score greater than or equal to 2; n = 14) and those with little 
to no knowledge (n = 19) were also non-significant (all p values > 0.22). 
 
Post-task ratings of cue importance 
After the task of viewing poker hands was completed, participants were prompted with 
the opportunity to adjust their original pre-task ratings. Mean post-task ratings are shown 
in the third column of Table 3. As expected, there were no significant differences 
between groups on these raw ratings (all p values > 0.16) because participants within 
groups were shown different cues conditional on their prior beliefs. Group differences 
between those with some degree of poker knowledge and those with little to no 
knowledge were again non-significant (all p values > 0.16). 
 
Changes in ratings   
To evaluate how participants learned during the task, the difference in ratings collected 
before and after was measured. The simple difference between the two ratings including 
their original valence was used so as to measure increase in likelihood that the 
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characteristic is associated with the better player; the participants‘ rating scale ranged 
from ―very unlikely‖ to ―very likely‖. Although this calculation neglects certain aspects of 
information gain, it was believed to be the most relevant interpretation for the present 
hypotheses. Because the cues seen by each participant varied, the data are analysed and 
shown as cues rather than specific profile items.  
 
Table 3. Participants rated nine items of information on how likely the better player of the 
two would be to have each characteristic using a sliding bar. The response scale ranged from 
-50 to +50 (no labels appeared on the screen), where a response of +50 suggests the 
participant believed the item was very likely to be associated with the better player and -50 
suggests the participant believed the item was very likely to be associated with the worse 
player. Initial ratings were collected before the start of the task and final ratings were 
collected after viewing all hands played. 
 
Profile Item 
Mean 
Initial Rating 
(SE) 
Mean 
Final Rating 
(SE) 
He has more years of experience playing 
poker than his opponent 
32.97 
(2.31) 
18.76 
(2.84) 
He plays poker more professionally (rather 
than as an amateur) than his opponent 
32.15 
(2.69) 
24.03 
(3.01) 
He won more money in this same 
tournament last year than his opponent 
14.33 
(2.91) 
13.88 
(2.96) 
He eats more before tournaments than his 
opponent 
-8.45 
(2.80) 
-7.03 
(3.17) 
He participates in  more sports than his 
opponent 
4.24 
(2.59) 
2.73 
(3.19) 
He speaks more languages than his 
opponent 
-3.42 
(3.12) 
-4.52 
(3.39) 
He has a higher favourite number than his 
opponent 
-3.03 
(2.66) 
-0.33 
(3.28) 
The player gambles on more non-poker 
games than his opponent 
-1.94 
(2.65) 
-1.72 
(3.05) 
He has more siblings than his opponent 
1.61 
(2.82) 
-0.48 
(2.78) 
 
 
Of particular interest to the present hypotheses, are changes in ratings for Cue A, a 
profile item that the participant had initially rated as highly predictive of poker player 
quality and that did not match the subsequent evidence, and Cue D, a profile item that 
the participant had initially rated as a poor predictor of poker player quality and that did 
not match the subsequent evidence. 
 
Updating of a focal cue—In post-task ratings of Cue A, participants adjusted their ratings 
of importance downward in agreement with the overall sum of evidence, as confirmed by 
a t-test against 0.00 (t(32) = -5.69, p < 0.001), shown in Table 4. Analysis shows that the 
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order in which evidence was presented did affect the participants‘ judgments (Confirm-
Disconfirm: M = -17.97, SE = 3.41; Disconfirm-Confirm: M = -9.95, SE = 2.81; F(1,29) 
= 3.30, p = 0.08, ŋ2p = 0.14), despite the power to detect this difference being low 
(power = 0.42). This analysis also showed that there was a significant interaction with 
level of reported poker knowledge (F(1,29) = 4.72, p = 0.04, ŋ2p = 0.14, power = 0.56), 
which is illustrated in Figure 12. In other words, there were no order effects for 
participants with no or little prior knowledge of poker but participants already familiar 
with poker did report a changed rating. The data suggest that the more knowledgeable 
participants‘ beliefs based on focal cues were highly sensitive only if their strong prior 
beliefs were recently disconfirmed. The main effect of poker knowledge was not significant 
(F(1,29) = 0.15, ns, power = 0.07). 
 
Table 4. Mean changes in cue ratings after viewing profiles and all hands played. 
 
Profile Item 
Initial  
Item Rank 
Mean Initial 
Rating (SE) 
Mean Final 
Rating (SE) 
Mean 
Difference (SE)  
Cue A 2
nd
 
21.58  
(4.95) 
9.15 
(3.91) 
-12.79 
(2.25) 
Cue B 3
rd
 
9.48 
(4.37) 
11.12 
(4.12) 
-1.88 
(1.59) 
Cue C 4
th
 
4.06 
(3.75) 
1.21 
(3.80) 
-1.39 
(1.71) 
Cue D 5
th
 
3.55 
(2.65) 
4.58 
(3.32) 
2.30 
(1.63) 
Cue E 8
th
 
0.36 
(1.44) 
-0.91 
(2.81) 
3.88 
(1.75) 
 
 
Updating of a peripheral cue—In post-task ratings of Cue D, participants did not adjust 
their ratings of importance upward in agreement with the overall sum of evidence, as 
confirmed by a t-test against 0.00 (t(32) = 1.42, ns), as shown in Table 4. However, 
analysis shows that the order in which evidence was presented did affect the participants‘ 
judgments (Confirm-Disconfirm: M = 8.22, SE = 2.19; Disconfirm-Confirm: M = -0.57, 
SE = 1.80; F(1,29) = 9.60, p < 0.01, ŋ2p = 0.25); those who viewed evidence 
disconfirming their initial beliefs last reflected the evidence while those who viewed 
disconfirming evidence first did not, contrary to predictions. Poker knowledge also had a 
main effect on judgments, whereby those with some or great prior knowledge adjusted 
their ratings upward significantly more than those with no or little prior knowledge 
(Unknowledgeable: M = -0.18, SE = 1.80; Knowledgeable: M = 7.83, SE = 2.19; F(1,29) 
= 7.97, p = 0.01, ŋ2p = 0.22). Again, the interaction of these two factors was also 
significant (F(1,29) = 3.82, p = 0.06, ŋ2p = 0.12, power = 0.47), as shown in Figure 12. 
These data suggest that the more knowledgeable participants who viewed disconfirming 
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evidence early quickly discounted it in favour of the confirming evidence that came after, 
while knowledgeable participants who viewed disconfirming evidence late easily 
discarded their initial expectations. 
 
Knowledgeable participants who observed first confirming evidence and later 
disconfirming evidence demonstrated superior learning from both focal and peripheral 
cues. Unknowledgeable participants appear to have learned only about focal cues. A 
mixed ANOVA with factors of condition, poker knowledge, and cue type finds that the 
three-way interaction is marginally significant (F(1,35) = 3.77, p = 0.06, ŋp
2 = 0.10, power 
= 0.47). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 12. Change in participant ratings of cue predictive strength. The panel on the left 
shows data for Cue A, an item initially ranked as having high importance. The panel on the 
right shows data for Cue D, an item initially ranked as having medium importance. Change 
was calculated by taking the difference of the absolute means of each group. Bars show 
standard errors of the means. 
 
 
Wagers 
Participants were prompted before the start of each hand to wager on which player they 
believed would win the next hand. As shown in Figure 13, all participants initially favour 
the ―better‖ player that matched their expectations for a high quality poker player to a 
similar degree (Confirm-Disconfirm: M = 6.86, SE = 0.51; Disconfirm-Confirm: M = 
6.00, SE = 0.45; t(31) = 1.25, ns). And, participants‘ wagers on their respective eighth 
and final hands are also not significantly different (Confirm-Disconfirm: M = 4.86, SE = 
0.61; Disconfirm-Confirm: M = 4.79, SE = 0.50; t(31) = 0.09, ns). As participants 
initially process only one type of evidence (either confirming or disconfirming), there are 
significant differences in wagers (time periods one through four), but as the second type 
of evidence is integrated with prior beliefs (time periods five through eight, including the 
evidence observed up to this point) the experimental groups‘ wagers converge. 
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To understand the effects of the different types of evidence on wagering, we compare the 
two experimental groups‘ wagers from different chronological time periods when the 
groups viewed the same evidence. Because of the predictive nature of the wagers, only 
three wagers out of four from each evidence block are comparable across experimental 
groups (i.e., one group‘s first wager for the block of confirming evidence is made based 
on prior beliefs only while the other experimental group‘s fifth wager for the based on 
the previous block of four hands of disconfirming evidence shown as well as their prior 
beliefs). This is shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Mean online wagers for the upcoming hand in favour of the ―better‖ player, with 
chronological time on the horizontal axis, are shown here. Bars show standard errors of the 
means.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Mean online wagers for the upcoming hand in favour of the ―better‖ player, with 
type of evidence preceding the prediction on the horizontal axis, are shown here. In the left 
panel, data represent the wagers made after viewing evidence that confirms participants‘ 
initial beliefs; in the right panel, wagers made after viewing evidence that disconfirms 
participants‘ beliefs. Bars show standard errors of the means. 
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When processing confirming evidence, there was a significant difference between 
experimental groups: after observing evidence that disconfirmed their beliefs about the 
―better‖ player, participants wagered significantly less in favour of the ―better‖ player 
(mixed ANOVA F(1,31) = 4.81, p = 0.04, ŋ2p = 0.13). This difference was not significant 
when processing disconfirming evidence (F(1,31) = 0.15, ns); first observing 
disconfirming evidence did not lower participants‘ wagers when observing evidence 
aligned with expectations. Adding poker knowledge as a covariate did not improve the 
model. 
 
Discussion 
It was hypothesised that presentation order of evidence that confirmed and disconfirmed 
participants‘ prior beliefs about poker player quality would have a significant effect on 
wagering and learning about cue diagnosticity in the experimental task. Pre- and post-task 
ratings of cue importance were compared to assess learning as well as wagers collected 
online during the task. Learning was found to vary on two factors: presentation order 
and self-rated knowledge of poker. Wagers reflected a decreasing confidence in initial 
expectations with final wagers approximating indifference between the two players 
regardless of experimental condition. 
 
Learning from cues 
For both subjectively focal and peripheral cues, knowledgeable participants exhibited 
recency effects in learning and wagering. This pattern of results does not support a 
Bayesian learning prediction (no presentation order effects) or a model-based learning 
prediction (primacy effects). The data may indicate that participants with expertise 
completed the task differently. These participants may have been more sensitive to the 
incoming evidence than to the profile information given (several items of which were 
nondiagnostic, by design) and ultimately judged players by their observable decisions. 
Also, these participants may have treated the experimental task as a typical poker game, 
and made inferences about poker player quality from the change in play quality over 
time.  
 
The data suggest that unknowledgeable participants also show recency effects but that 
they are less capable of learning from the task; unknowledgeable participants learn from 
salient focal cues only and block all learning from peripheral cues in the environment. 
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This finding suggests that lay participants may weigh their prior beliefs heavily compared 
to the evidence observed. Despite being unknowledgeable about the game, these 
participants may believe their prior beliefs to be more reliable evidence that their naive 
interpretations of the incoming evidence. The pattern of results would be explained by a 
relatively high confidence (weight) in the strong prior beliefs (Cue A) but no confidence 
in either the weaker prior beliefs (Cue D) or the processing of incoming evidence. 
 
Overall, the relatively strong response by all participants to the focal cue may also be a 
result of the relatively strong evidence used to disconfirm it in the experimental design: 
the poker player made severe mistakes. In contrast, the response to the peripheral cue 
was based on relatively weak evidence used to confirm it in the experimental design: the 
players‘ performance was not equivalently positive. Direct comparisons between ratings 
of the two cues should be made with careful consideration. 
 
Wagering 
The wagering data show that participants are highly sensitive to disconfirming evidence. 
When observing evidence that disconfirmed prior beliefs, participants reduced wagers in 
favour of the player regardless of previous evidence observed. However, when observing 
confirming evidence, the disconfirming evidence still weighed heavily into wagering 
decisions. However, this result may also be a product of the above mentioned disparity in 
experimental design of evidence strength. Regardless of this limitation, the convergence 
of participants‘ wagers across experimental groups indicates that presentation order does 
not significantly affect decision making. Similarities may be drawn to jury decision 
making, where jurors must process evidence presented in non-chronological order from 
both the prosecution and the defence. The findings in this poker study suggest that 
jurors‘ decisions may also not be a function of presentation order of evidence. Currently, 
there is mixed evidence on this issue (Kerstholt & Jackson, 1998; Lagnado & Harvey, 
2008; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). 
 
Expertise 
The analyses of the effect of expertise on learning support the literature on expert 
confirmation bias in games. In chess games, experts have been found to exhibit the 
confirmation bias (Bilalic, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008; Cowley & Byrne, 2004). Of 
particular relevance to the present findings, Bilalic, et al. (2008) concluded that this 
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occurs by influencing mechanisms that determine what information is attended to. Eye 
tracking confirmed that experts persisted in focusing on the first hypothesis while 
ostensibly searching for alternatives. The present data show that not only do agents 
attend to those cues during information search and decision making, but they also store 
the information in this way, in some instances neglecting peripheral information. 
 
The full process of belief updating includes first attending to evidence, then evaluating it, 
and finally combining it with prior beliefs. The data presented here illustrate how 
decision makers including experts may deviate from optimal standards. Particularly in 
environments that conflict with prior expectations, the updating process determines how 
quickly an agent converges on a more appropriate model of the environment. In this 
experiment, it was shown that the coherence bias exhibited in Study 6 of this chapter 
may be due to biases in attention whereby peripheral cues are not attended to. Although 
the evidence does not support the model-based account‘s strong predictions, the 
significant interactions between knowledge and presentation order do suggest a variation 
of a model-based account while at the very least casting doubt on the usefulness of the 
normative and heuristic approaches. Whereas rational theories of decision making 
assume that the process is isolated from the limitations and disruptions that are often 
found elsewhere in cognition, such as attention blind spots, confirmation biases, and 
working memory limitations, the present study demonstrates the importance of 
understanding prior beliefs and the biased nature of belief updating under dynamic 
uncertainty in gambling. 
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Chapter 5 
General Discussion 
 
 
My goal for this thesis was to present a strong case to researchers to study gambling from 
a model-based perspective. To support my case, I drew upon the established findings of 
several lines of research including real-world and laboratory-based gambling studies, 
inductive inference, heuristics and biases, reinforcement learning, hypothesis evaluation, 
and mental models. Despite the dominance of other perspectives in contemporary 
gambling research, I argued that the model-based approach made a superior fit with 
gambling behaviour because it simultaneously captures the realistic strengths and 
weaknesses of cognition found in empirical research while also making sound theoretical 
sense. I continued by presenting seven studies, which ranged from simple risk to 
dynamic uncertainty, laboratory to real-world contexts, and computational modelling to 
abstract reasoning. By covering such a broad range, I intended to show the breadth and 
depth of the model-based approach. 
 
Summary 
In Chapter 2, we studied simple games of risk. By dismissing the traditional assumption 
that punters relied solely on the incoming evidence, it became evident that a significant 
portion of punters do just the opposite. Similarly, by altering the framing of a dice game, 
it was found that beliefs are sensitive to perceived (and not formally relevant) 
representations of how the game works. The studies illustrated that individuals use 
internal representations of games, which include beliefs about the underlying outcome-
generating process. 
 
In Chapter 3, to examine the cognitive processes underlying these behaviours, we studied 
slot machines, a game of fixed but unknown uncertainty. The first two studies 
demonstrated that people consider prior knowledge when updating beliefs, resulting in 
hypothesis testing biases in inference that persist despite the absence of diagnostic 
confirming evidence. And crucially, we also saw that beliefs about outcome space 
affected beliefs about outcome-generating processes. To complement these findings on a 
computational level, a modelling exercise simulated individual decision making and found 
that an assumption of a similarity mechanism of judgment is insufficient for producing 
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the empirical data presented. Combined with the findings of Chapter 2, these results 
make evident the highly structured nature of people‘s internal representations in 
gambling. 
 
In Chapter 4, we studied the process of belief revision in the dynamically uncertain 
paradigms of horse race and poker betting. It was found that participants seemed to 
prefer coherence and consistency in beliefs over time rather than maximum reward. A 
second experiment showed that this phenomenon was due to attentional learning biases 
whereby focal cues were learnt at the expense of peripheral cues. However, this result 
interacted with expertise such that knowledgeable participants were able to attend to all 
cues.   
 
When the facts changed, what did participants do? They changed the facts. In the studies 
presented here, it was shown that people develop and maintain internal representations 
of problems that may be separate from reality, even at the expense of profits. When 
tasked specifically with learning about their environment, prior beliefs and expectations 
drove learning, regardless of what the data suggested. These studies have shown that 
people weigh their prior beliefs more heavily than the data, regardless of their priors‘ 
source or quality. They weigh less heavily their evaluations of incoming evidence, and 
further these evaluations are subject to assessments of quality or confidence unlike prior 
beliefs. It seems that people were less inclined to change their minds in the face of 
disconfirming evidence because they did not see that it was disconfirming.  
 
Consider again the two questions I put forward at the start: why do people continue to 
gamble despite losses? and why do only some people have problems with only some 
forms of gambling? These are hard questions that will take a multidisciplinary effort to 
resolve. But here I have shown that part of the answer lies in misunderstanding the 
fundamental type of uncertainty underlying the problem and failing to see and use the 
true value of evidence. A framework built around the individual‘s prior beliefs, 
perception of the outcome-generating process, and updating of his beliefs is a productive 
way to pursue answers to these questions. Within this framework, other disciplines can 
take on parts of the puzzle, from anthropologists and sociologists contributing to 
understanding how prior beliefs are developed to computational scientists contributing 
to understanding how beliefs are updated. Several disciplines are already on board, 
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including artificial intelligence researchers (Sutton, 1991), neuroscientists (Dayan & Niv, 
2008), psychologists (T. L. Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005) and economists (Feltovich, 
2000).  
 
Broader implications for cognitive psychology 
In each study presented here, it was found that structured representations of the games 
and understanding of the underlying outcome-generating processes were critical for 
describing individual behaviour. This thesis supports research in the greater field of 
cognitive psychology on the role of causal models. For example, the findings here echo 
the arguments in Krynski and Tenenbaum (2007); in this probabilistic reasoning 
framework, deviations from normative models are explained by Bayesian inferences over 
causal models. The authors show that people‘s judgments and reasoning are related to 
the structure of their mental representations. And these results also support recent 
findings on the importance of probabilistic causal models in evidential reasoning 
(Lagnado, 2010; Sloman, 2005). The evidence presented in this thesis and in an emerging 
collection of research indicates that descriptive accounts of decision making and 
reasoning must make room for structure and causal models. 
 
Future directions 
The results presented here indicate that there are many applications and extensions of the 
model-based approach to studying gambling. As with any study of gambling, further 
replications of these results in real-world contexts with significant monetary gains and 
losses and, of course, the option to not play at all, would add a solid foundation of 
support for the validity of the data.  
 
The development of methods for eliciting prior beliefs from individuals would be an 
interesting and practically useful next step for this research. As we have seen, individuals 
maintain rich representations of problems that affect how subsequent evidence is 
interpreted and judgments and decisions are made. By emphasising the importance of 
structured representations, researchers can understand how representations of events and 
abstract concepts and categories are structured and related to each other. The graphical 
methods [hand-drawn pie charts] used in Chapter 3 Study 4 to elicit subjective 
probabilities about potential outcomes is one step in this direction. Indeed, conducting 
this work in the gambling domain should lead to interesting developments due to the 
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nature of randomness in games and hidden outcome-generating processes. Refining this 
method may lead to multi-disciplinary use and accurate and standardised collection of 
subjective probabilities for use in understanding how subjective probability judgments 
relate to actual probabilities in gambling and in other areas of research. 
 
To advance the field on a different level, process-level models may be developed based 
on the initial work presented here. There are already researchers developing models for 
learning of causal schemas in everyday reasoning using hierarchical Bayesian frameworks 
(Kemp, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2007). Future work in developing a computational 
account of gambling may use these as foundations for a model-based account. 
 
Impact of the results for users of gambling research 
The approach advocated in this thesis creates a space for policymakers and clinicians to 
take on gambling research anew. Although the studies presented here primarily used non-
gamblers, where comparisons were made to regular gamblers there was no evidence of 
significant differences. This notion is supported by previous literature (Corney & 
Cummings, 1985; Delfabbro, 2004; Wagenaar, 1988). It may be helpful for the field of 
gambling research to recognise that ―gamblers‖ are not so different from others, and 
gambling is not so different from other tasks in everyday life.  
 
Policymakers might take away that the greatest impact that policy can have on gambling 
problems is the minimisation of the prevalence of chance elements in games. Even with 
games as simple as roulette, where the outcomes and their probabilities are transparently 
available and the outcome-generating process is known, people find ways to impose 
subjective control over uncertainty. Increasing transparency, improving signage, and 
reducing marketing efforts are all small steps toward reducing the outward appearance of 
gambling harm but may have no significant effect on the prevalence and development of 
gambling problems. Indeed, the proportion of problem gamblers in the UK has held 
steady for the last ten years (National Centre for Social Research, 2007).  
 
Clinicians should see that this research reflects much of their own work in understanding 
gambling behaviour at the individual level but might also take away that current methods 
of cognitive-behavioural treatment and statistical training may be updated to include 
elicitations of prior beliefs before determining a course of treatment. There is no single 
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irrational mindset that fits all those with gambling problems. By working with the 
patient‘s internal representations and hypotheses about the way that the game works, the 
type of evidence that is able to disconfirm inaccurate beliefs and change minds may be 
found.  
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Appendix 1 
Problem Gambling Severity Index (Ferris & Wynne, 2001) 
 
Thinking about the last 12 months… 
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Have you bet more than you could really afford to lose?     
Have you needed to gamble with larger amounts of 
money to get the same feeling of excitement? 
    
When you gambled, did you go back another day to try to 
win back the money you lost? 
    
Have you borrowed money or sold anything to get money 
to gamble? 
    
Have you felt that you might have a problem with 
gambling? 
    
Has gambling caused you any health problems, including 
stress or anxiety? 
    
Have people criticized your betting or told you that you 
had a gambling problem, regardless of whether or not you 
thought it was true? 
    
Has your gambling caused any financial problems for you 
or your household? 
    
Have you felt guilty about the way you gamble or what 
happens when you gamble? 
    
 
Scoring Instructions for the PGSI  
The total score is calculated using the following scale: 
Never = 0 
Some of the time = 1 
Most of the time = 2 
Almost always = 3 
Scores for the nine items are summed, and the results are interpreted as follows: 
0  Non-problem gambling. 
1 - 2  Low level of problems with few or no identified negative consequences. 
3 - 7  Moderate level of problems leading to some negative consequences. 
8 +  Problem gambling with negative consequences and a possible loss of control. 
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Appendix 2 
Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) 
 
Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
 
In the Big Bucks Lottery, the chances of winning a 10 pound prize is 1%. What is your 
best guess about how many people would win a 10 pound prize if 1,000 people each buy 
a single ticket to Big Bucks? 
 
In the Acme Publishing Sweepstakes, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What 
percent of tickets to Acme Publishing Sweepstakes win a car? 
 
Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
1 in 100 1 in 1000 1 in 10 
 
Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?  
1% 10%5% 
 
If Person A's risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B's risk is double 
that of A's, what is B's risk? 
 
If Person A's chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B's risk is 
double that of A's, what is B's risk? 
 
If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of *100*? 
 
If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people would be expected to get the 
disease out of *1000*? 
 
If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 
____% chance of getting the disease. 
 
The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how many 
of them are expected to get infected? 
